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A fragile Iran truce, a high‑stakes Modi–Trump reset and a hard‑nosed case for “India First” – in the latest edition of ‘Point Blank’, Shishir Gupta, Executive Editor, Hindustan Times, lays out how these strands are converging into a decisive few weeks for New Delhi’s foreign and security policy.
The starting point is the imminent Iran–US interim deal that could lift the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz after three and a half months of war. US President Donald Trump has announced that the blockade will be lifted and an interim arrangement signed on June 19, opening the world’s most critical energy chokepoint to maritime traffic again. For India, heavily dependent on Gulf oil, that alone is a shot in the arm: 16 days of ceasefire have already pulled prices down and injected optimism into global markets.
Yet, as Shishir Gupta stresses, this is no peace agreement; it is a 60‑day breathing space to negotiate the real prize – a nuclear deal. Washington’s first military objective in this war was to neutralise Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile; without verifiable rollback on that front, he argues, the coming deal risks looking like “no deal” at all, no different from the JCPOA of 2015 that Trump tore up. The Strait of Hormuz, in this reading, was always a secondary objective for both the US and Israel, useful leverage but not the core strategic issue.
That core has three layers…
Iran’s nuclear programme, especially enriched uranium.
Its growing ballistic missile arsenal.
A network of empowered proxies – Hezbollah, the Houthis, Kataib Hezbollah and others – ring‑fencing Israel with longer‑range rockets and missiles.
Until those are addressed, Gupta cautions, any celebration is premature; the “devil lies in the detail” of a still‑unseen text.
One intriguing sub‑plot is whether a third country could physically hold Iran’s enriched uranium to make an agreement stick. Moscow has done this before and has reportedly offered to do so again, leading to speculation over a Russian role. Gupta is sceptical, reflecting the American line that any deposit must be under neutral International Atomic Energy Agency custody, not with a rival great power.
Bringing Russia – or by that logic, China – into the core of the Iran file would, in Washington’s eyes, turn a bilateral war into yet another arena of major‑power competition. It would also reopen the domestic political wound of Trump’s alleged proximity to Moscow by effectively “opening a third front” with Russia as custodian of Iran’s most sensitive material. For the US and Israel, he suggests, a genuine win requires Iran to part with its enriched uranium under an arrangement that is technically watertight and politically sellable at home.
Iran, for its part, will market whatever emerges as a victory: it stood up to the US militarily, blocked an externally imposed regime change and demonstrated that it can shut and reopen Hormuz at will, now even hinting at charging “maintenance” and “security” fees for energy traffic. That narrative of leverage will play strongly in Tehran, regardless of what the fine print says.
All of this forms the backdrop to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming meeting with Trump on the sidelines of the G7 – their first in a year and a half and, by Gupta’s account, a packed agenda. The headline item will be Iran: Modi wants to hear directly what the US believes it has achieved in a 60‑day ceasefire and what the nuclear negotiation horizon looks like before Delhi recalibrates its own energy and regional posture.
The second pillar is trade. Under Section 301, the US has slapped a 12.5% tariff on Indian goods on forced‑labour grounds, even as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Vietnam – all deeply integrated with Chinese supply chains – face only 10%. An earlier Indian attempt at reciprocal tariffs was struck down by the US Supreme Court, forcing Delhi back to the table to seek what Gupta calls a “competitive tariff” – parity with peer exporters so Indian products can hold their own in the American market. Washington, he notes, may try to add another lever by invoking “excess capacities” as a pretext for fresh sanctions, but Delhi’s position is blunt: if tariffs are competitive, they can live with it; if not, friction is inevitable.
A third, politically sensitive item will be the recent killing of three Indian sailors when US forces targeted a tanker in the Gulf of Oman. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s call with Secretary of State Marco Rubio was, Gupta says, “very tough” and ended with both sides talking past each other. Delhi termed the use of deadly force “unjustified”; Washington argued the vessel had violated instructions and tried to run the blockade. Modi, Gupta believes, will make it clear in person that Indian lives cannot be collateral damage in a war India is not party to.
Alongside these flashpoints sit a series of structural issues: delays in supplying F404 jet engines to India, broader supply‑chain concerns, and a full sweep of the strategic landscape from China and Russia to the Ukraine war and global energy security after Hormuz reopens. Despite tensions, Gupta insists there are “a whole lot of pluses” in the relationship, not least the ability of Modi and Trump to speak bluntly and directly to each other.
The Iran file has also given Pakistan a diplomatic role it has long craved. Together with Qatar, Islamabad has helped mediate the interim arrangement now nearing signature, with some buzz of Saudi support behind the scenes. Pakistan’s generals have historically enjoyed favour in Washington – from Ayub and Yahya Khan to Zia‑ul‑Haq and Asim Munir – and the army will showcase this mediation to rebrand Pakistan as a “mainstream” player rather than a terrorism hub.
Gupta sketches what Islamabad will likely seek in return: better equipment from the US, more money from the IMF and World Bank, and some relief at the Financial Action Task Force, all ultimately aimed at gaining leverage vis‑à‑vis India. But he also underlines the structural problem – Pakistan “plays both sides,” courting both Washington and Beijing, and buys major defence hardware from each. That dual‑track strategy fits neatly with a broader reality: neither the US nor China is particularly invested in seeing India emerge as an untrammelled success.
In his view, Pakistan’s present high may prove fleeting. If the Iranian nuclear question is genuinely settled and Tehran’s destabilising role since the 1979 revolution recedes, the Middle East could calm. Afghanistan already no longer offers Pakistan the strategic depth it once did; once Iran’s file is closed, Washington’s gaze will drift back to the adversaries it “should have been focusing on in the very first place” – China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.
Perhaps the most striking portion of the conversation is Gupta’s argument that India must stop seeing the world through American, Chinese or Russian lenses and return to a pure interests‑based “India First” approach. The border crises of 1962, Doklam and May 2020, he notes, all underscored the same lesson: in the end, India stands alone on its own frontiers. That means buying Russian oil if it keeps the economy running, hardening against Pakistan’s and China’s military acquisitions, and investing heavily at home in research, development and defence manufacturing.
Curiously, he credits Trump with accelerating that strategic introspection. By squeezing India on tariffs and pressuring Delhi during Indo‑Pak skirmishes, Washington forced India to accept that it cannot rely on any external supplier – American, European or otherwise – for vital military kit. The push towards indigenous production and defence exports is, in his telling, one of the “plus” outcomes of a tough US line.
Gupta also argues that Trump has punctured the West’s moral high ground by surfacing uncomfortable truths: the Jeffrey Epstein scandal and the ways in which elites are compromised; accusations of election manipulation by elements of the FBI, CIA and enforcement machinery; and, more recently, official acknowledgement that US funding went into gain‑of‑function research linked to the Covid‑19 pandemic. When a virus that killed millions flows from such research, he suggests, and when Western leaders will not even name its origins after Trump bluntly called it the “China virus,” the old certainties about Western virtue erode.
That erosion, in Gupta’s telling, dovetails with a hardening realism in Delhi, Washington and Jerusalem alike. Modi and Trump are both unapologetically “country‑first” leaders; Netanyahu operates on a similar calculus for Israel’s survival. Whether it is the US demanding Iranian nuclear rollback, Israel hitting Hezbollah and the Houthis in response to proxy attacks, or India buying discounted Russian crude, the pattern is the same: major powers acting on narrow national interests, not abstract alignments.
For India, the implication is stark. Its space in the “comity of nations” will be secured not by choosing a camp but by building enough economic and military heft to say no — to tariffs that undercut its exporters, to operations that kill its sailors, and to narratives that ask it to be pro‑anyone but itself. In a world where everyone else has dropped the pretence, Gupta argues, it is time for Delhi to be unabashedly, systemically and strategically pro‑India.
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