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Russia & Ukraine
Ukraine
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct another massive strike against Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on May 29 that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that Russia is preparing a new massive strike package against Ukraine.[1] Zelensky did not specify the timeline for the planned Russian strike. Zelensky correctly warned on May 23 of a massive Russian strike ahead of Russia’s devastating missile and drone strike package that included 90 missiles on the night of May 23 to 24.[2]
Ukrainian forces struck Russian military assets, including an Iskander missile system, in Rostov Oblast on the night of May 29 to 30. Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that Ukrainian strikes destroyed two Tu-142 long-range aircraft at a Russian military air base in Taganrog and an Iskander missile system at a launch position near Taganrog.[3] Geolocated footage published on May 30 confirms the destruction of a Tu-142 at the Taganrog Airport and the Iskander system near Mykhailovka (northwest of Taganrog).[4] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi, citing satellite imagery and open sources, reported that the two Tu-142 aircraft have been in long-term storage at the Taganrog Aviation Plant since 2011 and that Russian forces moved them in April and May 2026 onto auxiliary runways for unclear reasons.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker at the Taganrog oil depot and the Kurganneftoprodukt oil terminal in Taganrog overnight.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces damaged a fuel tank at the oil terminal.[7] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes started fires at the port, a tanker, a fuel tank, and an administrative building in Taganrog.[8]
The Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian supply lines in occupied Ukraine also includes remote mining in depth. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 29 that Ukrainian forces have started to remotely mine roads along the M-14 Mariupol-Melitopol highway, the same highway that Ukrainian forces are interdicting with Hornet drones to degrade Russian operational logistics.[9] The milblogger claimed that Ukraine’s remote mining could disable unarmored vehicles and cause transport disruptions and road closures. The milblogger had previously warned on May 26 that scattered mines — should Ukraine pursue this line of effort — could regularly close the road to traffic, slow traffic on alternative routes, and shut down nighttime transport.[10] Another Russian milblogger posted pictures on May 29 purportedly showing the new types of mines Ukrainian forces are dropping from drones at a depth of 100 to 150 kilometers from the frontline.[11] Ukraine has significantly increased its mid-range drone strike campaign against ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Ukraine, particularly in southern Ukraine near Mariupol, and these reported new remote mining efforts aim to support this strike campaign to disrupt and disable Russian supplies to various sectors of the front.[12]
The Kremlin is using the May 28-29 Russian drone strike against Galati, Romania, to set conditions to absolve Russia of blame for any accidental Russian drone strikes against Moldova, or possibly a false flag attack against Moldova, in the future. The Russian Embassy in Moldova claimed on May 29 that Moldovan authorities and their Western partners may be preparing a “staging” like the downing of the drone in Galati, Romania, on May 28-29.[13] The embassy claimed that the “staging” would aim to blame Russia and provoke an escalation in Moldovan-Russian relations. The embassy claimed that Romanian and Moldovan authorities are united in their Russophobic views and use “identical playbooks.” The embassy claimed that statements about Russia’s involvement in the May 28-29 drone downing are “unsubstantiated.” A Russian Geran-2 drone struck an apartment complex in Galati on May 29, and the Kremlin has denied that it was a Russian drone.[14] The Russian embassy’s claims set conditions to absolve Russia of any responsibility in the event a Russian drone accidentally strikes Moldova in the future. The embassy’s claims may also aim to set conditions to justify a future false flag attack against Moldova with a Russian drone. ISW continues to assess that increasingly frequent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted a reckless policy that accepts the risk of Russian drones entering NATO and Moldovan airspace as an acceptable consequence of Russian strikes against Ukraine.[15] Putin now appears to accept the risk of inflicting civilian casualties in NATO states as an acceptable consequence of Russia’s strike campaign. NATO may need to consider negotiating possible air defense agreements with Ukraine and Moldova as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to present claims about Russia’s battlefield successes that do not correspond with reality to pressure Ukraine to surrender to his demands. Putin claimed on May 29 in a press conference with journalists that Russian forces are advancing in all directions every day, such that only Russia has the “right” to say that the war is coming to its completion, and implied that Russia’s war is heading towards completing its goals.[16] Putin’s claim implies that Russia is in such a strong battlefield position that Ukraine will have to concede to Russia’s demands to end the war. Putin’s claims ignore Ukraine’s various battlefield successes, including significantly slowing Russia’s rate of advance, Ukraine recently liberating more territory than Russian forces seized in April 2026, and a maturing mid- and long-range strike campaign.[17] ISW recently assessed that the Russian military command’s repeated exaggerations of the Russian military’s successes on the ground have likely given Putin a false perception of the battlefield situation.[18] These exaggerations are likely leading Putin to believe his forces can achieve his goals in the near to medium term despite the fact that Russia’s battlefield performance has steadily declined in 2026.
Russian authorities continue their attempts to find new ways to mitigate Ukraine’s growing strikes against targets deep in the Russian rear by having oblast-level officials establish a new state entity for coordinating air defense activities, which may include overseeing the establishment of new air defense units. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on May 29 that Russia needs to continue to strengthen its air defenses.[19] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin signed a decree on May 30 creating the new Nizhny Novgorod Oblast-level “Ministry for the Protection of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Facilities.”[20] Nikitin stated that the ministry will be the hub coordinating the oblast’s contributions to Russia’s wider air defense capabilities and the protection of the oblast’s security during the war.[21] Nikitin added that the ministry will support the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and protect the primary targets of Ukrainian strikes. The region’s deputy prime minister, Vladimir Tuzhilin, will head the new ministry. Nikitin’s decree represents the first new oblast-level “ministry” responsible for air defense and likely represents official efforts to find new ways to combat Ukraine’s growing drone threat. Leningrad Oblast similarly announced reforms in April 2026 to respond to Ukrainian strikes, including recruiting callups for air defense needs near critical infrastructure and supplying regional material and tactical assistance to Russian air defenders.[22] A Russian insider source recently claimed on May 28 that the Russian federal government is increasingly shifting the burden for funding air defenses to regional governments, and the new oblast reforms related to air defense are in line with this regional-level focus.[23] The command and control and administrative control over any Nizhny Novgorod units that may be formed as part of the new ministry remain unclear.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai overnight on May 29 to 30. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces struck an oil enterprise in Armavir (roughly 475 kilometers from the frontline).[24] The Armavir City Administration acknowledged that a drone strike damaged a facility of the Southern Oil Company.[25]
Satellite imagery collected on May 28 confirms damage to the Taganrog Air Base after the Ukrainian Storm Shadow strike on May 26-27. The satellite imagery shows that the strike destroyed two facilities of a Russian communications and radio support battalion at the air base.[26] The imagery shows that Russian forces moved military equipment to another location after the strike.
See topline text for reports of Ukrainian strikes against Rostov Oblast on May 29 to 30.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Sumy direction on May 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into western Kvyanytsya (north of Sumy City).[28]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 30 but did not advance.[29] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are trying not only to advance in the Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) direction, but are also trying to advance along the state border in small groups.[30] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have enough resources to often fail, retreat, pull up reserves, and then attack again. The spokesperson stated that Russian soldiers are often poorly trained or wounded. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian forces are most actively attacking and crossing the border in areas with green foliage, likely due to the concealment the foliage offers.[31]
Ukrainian forces continue to expand the kill zone in the Kharkiv direction, including into Russian territory. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that the kill zone in the area has doubled or tripled in the past year and extends into Russia.[32]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 30.
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northwestern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[33]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage facility near Ivanivka (either roughly 3 or 20 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of May 29-30.[34]
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations north and northeast of Borova on May 29 and 30 but did not advance.[35]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 340th Separate Engineer-Sapper Battalion (144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Nvolyubivka (southeast of Borova and roughly 8 kilometers behind the frontline), the first evidence ISW has observed of this unit’s activity in Ukraine.[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and east of Slovyansk on May 29 and 30 but did not advance.[37] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on May 28 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Zakitne (east of Slovyansk).[38]
Order of Battle: A 2S5 Giatsint-S artillery crew of the Russian 72nd Artillery Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) is reportedly striking Ukrainian personnel and equipment in the Lyman direction, the first evidence ISW has observed of this unit.[39]
Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in central Kostyantynivka.[40] Geolocated footage published on May 29 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in areas in central Kostyantynivka in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[41]
Russian forces continue infiltration missions within Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on May 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember south of the Donetska Railroad in southeastern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[42]
Russian forces are using glide bombs and drone strikes to target bridges in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (southeast of Druzhkivka). Geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-500 glide bomb strike against a bridge over the Kryvyi Torets River in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka.[43] Additional geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Russian forces using a fiber optic drone to detonate a likely Ukrainian explosive device under another bridge over the river in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Dobropillya and near Pokrovsk on May 29 and 30 but did not advance.[45]
Russian forces continue highly attritional infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction. A spokesperson of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces are focusing their small group infiltrations on the northwestern and northeastern flanks of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration.[46] The spokesperson stated that usually only one or two Russian servicemembers from a group of 10 infiltrators manage to survive. The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are focusing on bringing artillery guns and unmanned reconnaissance and strike weapons closer to the front.[47] The chief of staff stated that the elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division in the Pokrovsk direction pose a threat to Ukrainian forces in the area, as the division always receives a large number of reinforcements.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on May 30.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 30, but Russian sources acknowledge that advances in the area are difficult.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that the situation for Russian forces in Oleksandrohrad (east of Oleksandrivka) is a “mess” and that Russian forces are unable to advance in the area.[49] Geolocated footage published on May 29 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-500 glide bomb strike against Pidhavrylivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[50]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian GLOCs and energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade published footage on May 30 showing Ukrainian forces conducting a series of strikes along the M-30 Debaltseve-Luhansk City highway.[51] The footage shows Ukrainian forces striking several Russian trucks, including ones carrying ammunition, and temporarily blocking the road. Geolocated footage published on May 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian trucks along the M-03 Slovyansk-Bakhmut highway and M-30 highway near Debaltseve (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline).[52] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian gas storage facility near Yenakiieve (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline).[53]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[54]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions southwest of Charivne (east of Orikhiv) and north of Luhivkse (southeast of Orikhiv).[55]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration at the Prymorskyi Posad Training Ground (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[56]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on May 30.
Crimean occupation authorities are imposing fuel rationing on civilians, as Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes strain Russian logistics in occupied Crimea and occupied southern Ukraine. Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov announced on May 29 that Russian occupation authorities will restrict sales of AI-95 gasoline in occupied Crimea to no more than 20 liters (5.283 gallons) per person per day beginning on May 30.[57] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 30 that Ukrainian strikes have caused disruptions along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway), subsequently causing fuel shortages in occupied Crimea.[58] Meduza noted that fuel shortages have already produced long lines across gas stations in occupied Crimea.[59]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) boat maintenance facility in occupied Voloshyne (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline).[60] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian marine oil terminal in occupied Feodosia (roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline), which supplies fuel and lubricants by sea to occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine.[61]
Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes on occupied Ukraine are reportedly causing Russian forces to redirect servicemembers and equipment from some frontline areas. The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on May 30, citing an insider source in the Russian Dneper Grouping of Forces, that Russian forces are moving trained drone observation troops and electronic warfare equipment away from unspecified frontline positions to support Russian military logistics along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway.[62] Atesh reported that the Russian military command instituted a policy requiring Russian military convoys traveling along the M-14 highway to travel at night and in bad weather, go no less than 120 kilometers an hour, and include a person with a drone detector in each vehicle. These redeployments, if true, will likely further support Ukrainian efforts to achieve tactical drone supremacy in frontline sectors.[63]
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Bryansk Oblast, six Kh-101 cruise missiles from Vologda Oblast, and 290 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and Parodiya-type drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed five Kh-101 cruise missiles and 279 drones, that nine drones struck seven locations, and that debris fell on 10 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, agricultural, rail, and medical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhia, and Rivne oblasts.[65]
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19282
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2026/
[3] https://x.com/usf_army/status/2060641673772724578
[4] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2060621353602982373; https://x.com/usf_army/status/2060641673772724578; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13092
[5] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/urazheni-tu-142-na-zberiganni-z-2011-roku/
[6] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39309
[7] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39309
[8] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/5929
[9] https://t.me/milinfolive/173233; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[10] https://t.me/milinfolive/173043
[11] https://t.me/combat_engineer/11381
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[13] https://t.me/RusEmbMd/3286
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79910
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/
[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79910
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[19] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79910
[20] https://nobl dot ru/novosti-nizhegorodskoj-oblasti-za-vse-vremya/gubernator-nizhegorodskoy-oblasti-gleb-nikitin-vnes-izmeneniya-v-strukturu-regionalnogo-pravitelstva; https://tass dot ru/politika/27586977
[21] https://nobl dot ru/novosti-nizhegorodskoj-oblasti-za-vse-vremya/gubernator-nizhegorodskoy-oblasti-gleb-nikitin-vnes-izmeneniya-v-strukturu-regionalnogo-pravitelstva; https://tass dot ru/politika/27586977
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/
[23] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/1501; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[24] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19285
[25] https://t.me/armawir_adm/21078
[26] https://x.com/GloOouD/status/2060358220703469687
https://x.com/cyber_boroshno/status/2060357447328399396; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/suputnykovi-znimky-storm-shadow-taganrog/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39315; https://t.me/uvkkursk/402 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93739; https://t.me/wargonzo/34507
[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/34507
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39315 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39287 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20790 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39285 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43672 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8216 ; https://t.me/rybar/80677 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/29/chasto-cze-kaliky-yaki-vzhe-zaznaly-serjoznyh-poranen-poblyzu-vovchanska-vorog-atakuye-svoyimy-zh-poranenymy/ ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93739
[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/05/29/chasto-cze-kaliky-yaki-vzhe-zaznaly-serjoznyh-poranen-poblyzu-vovchanska-vorog-atakuye-svoyimy-zh-poranenymy/
[31] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1319181-akso-prosuvan-nemae-dalnist-urazenna-zrostae-vijskovij-48-oabr-pro-zbilsenna-kil-zoni-na-harkivsini/
[32] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1319181-akso-prosuvan-nemae-dalnist-urazenna-zrostae-vijskovij-48-oabr-pro-zbilsenna-kil-zoni-na-harkivsini/
[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12048; https://t.me/ombr41/2703
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39309
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39287 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20790 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39285
[36] https://t.me/grvZapad/18723
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39315; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39287 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20790 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39285; https://t.me/wargonzo/34507; https://t.me/grvZapad/18716
[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52314
[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/64116; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27584313; https://www.ntv dot ru/novosti/2976066/
[40] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060715762445128046; https://www.instagram.com/safari_ukraine/reel/DYEY–FS2VF/
[41] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060371882000413083; https://t.me/MSP1465/637; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060656982038663486; https://t.me/shock3OA/7246
[42] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060647739558445378; https://www.instagram.com/gentlemen.100ombr/reel/DY7Y9AwtrxV/
[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060661811016327227; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/29326
[44] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2060707219801280645; https://t.co/qcDy2J7uy2
[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/34507; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39315 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39287; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39285
[46] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1319217-rosijska-armia-tisne-na-flangah-pokrovskoi-aglomeracii-oficer-7-korpusu/
[47] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1319017-rf-bilse-zoseredzue-uvagu-na-pidtaguvanni-zasobiv-urazenna-vijskovij-25-opdbr-pro-pokrovskij-napramok/
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39315 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39287 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39285 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34507
[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52320
[50] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2060388579118055786; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/29314
[51] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1319157-vijskovi-pokazali-ak-pererizaut-dronami-trasu-iz-debalcevogo-do-alcevska/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1015700271406229?locale=uk_UA
[52] https://x.com/k_2army/status/2060395167815753993; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/36044
[53] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2421
[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12046; https://t.me/polk_210/6641
[55] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12047; https://t.me/stepova_61/2016
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39309
[57] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/27583019
[58] https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/05/30/vsu-atakuyut-suhoputnyy-koridor-v-krym-narusheno-dvizhenie-po-trasse-novorossiya-na-poluostrove-ne-hvataet-benzina
[59] https://meduza dot io/feature/2026/05/30/topliva-net-sovsem
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39309
[61] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1271711431393085 ; https://t.me/usf_army/1998
[62] https://t.me/atesh_ua/10086
[63] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/63300
[65] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29471 ; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1319367-u-kotelevskij-tg-na-poltavsini-ulamki-bpla-poskodili-zitlovi-budinki-ambulatoriu-ta-avtomobil/ ; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/33333 ; https://t.me/UZprymisky/3638; https://www.facebook.com/noha.mykola.petrovych/posts/pfbid02vQs85EZbxFd3gRXVEsgKe6AYq1SRyV1GnxBk99yj1KSuzSJV6Ui71xj938L5ZNPnl?locale=uk_UA; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/10369 ; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8845 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/61537; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/61524; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/61542; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/40938; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/40943; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/40946; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/40966 ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8182 ; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/10369
Assessment as of: 6:00 PM ET. Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET.
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