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Russia & Ukraine
Ukraine
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
The Russian military command is reportedly withdrawing forces from the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast as Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian supply lines in occupied Ukraine is rendering defenses in the area increasingly untenable. Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group Atesh reported on June 8 that one of its agents in the headquarters of the Russian Dnepr Group of Forces reported that elements of the Russian 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are abandoning their positions on the northern and western parts of the Kinburn Spit due to “completely disrupted” supplies.[1] The agent reported that ammunition, fuel, and food deliveries have stopped, that Russian forces on the spit have been unable to repel Ukrainian drone strikes, and that Russian losses have been growing. The agent reported that the Russian military command has begun redeploying an unspecified number of troops from the 337th VDV Regiment to an unspecified part of the “Zaporizhia sector” (possibly referring to the Orikhiv or Hulyaipole directions), but that the remaining elements on the Kinburn Spit are “virtually depleted” due to the lack of replenishment and can no longer defend the spit. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on June 8 that he could neither confirm nor deny the Atesh report but stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting operations to establish fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Kherson Oblast so Russian withdrawals from the Kinburn Spit are possible.[2] Ukraine’s expanding intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs in occupied southern and eastern Ukraine appears to be generating battlefield effects, which will likely continue to mature in the near future.[3] Russian forces have previously used their limited positions on the Kinburn Spit to conduct artillery strikes against Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast (four kilometers from the tip of the spit across the Dniprovska Gulf).[4]
The Kremlin continues to reject peace negotiations with Ukraine despite recent repeated Ukrainian offers for direct negotiations. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Frederich Merz issued a joint statement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 7 proposing conditions for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, including an immediate ceasefire, the resumption of negotiations, and the freezing of the current frontline as a starting point for negotiations.[5] Zelensky confirmed in an interview with Sky News on June 7 that he recently met with Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, who was acting as an intermediary for Russian President Vladimir Putin, in Kyiv City to convey that Ukraine is willing to freeze the frontline along the current line of contact and to resume peace negotiations, including via direct negotiations with Putin.[6] Zelensky also published an open letter to Putin on June 4 after meeting with Abramovich, in which he offered a leader-level meeting.[7] Putin subsequently rejected Zelensky’s offer for direct negotiations.[8] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated on June 8 the Kremlin’s commitment to the “understandings” that the United States and Russia allegedly reached at the August 2025 Alaska Summit, exploiting the lack of publicly available information about the alleged agreements in order to falsely portray Russia as a willing negotiator.[9] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov and Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev rejected the Ukrainian-European June 8 joint statement, stating that the proposals are “unacceptable” for Russia and that Russia can only achieve its war goals by “reaching Ukraine’s western borders.”[10]
NATO forces downed a drone over Latvia for the first time on June 8 after Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems diverted it into Latvian airspace. The Latvian National Armed Forces reported on June 8 that French Air Force fighter jets participating in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission downed a “foreign drone” – likely Ukrainian – that had entered Latvian airspace due to Russian EW jamming.[11] Latvian news source Delfi noted that this was the first time that NATO has downed a drone in Latvian airspace.[12] Russian EW systems previously caused a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to enter Romanian territorial waters on June 5.[13] Russian officials used the June 5 incident to advance false Russian narratives claiming that Ukraine is the aggressor in the war that Russia initiated and to deflect culpability away from Moscow.[14] The Kremlin will likely continue to use such incidents near or even within NATO borders to absolve Russia of blame for any accidental Russian drone strikes or for a false flag attack against Romania or the Baltic States in the future.[15]
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian forces continued long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of June 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Ukrainian strike started a fire at the Grushovaya oil terminal (just east of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai and roughly 350 kilometers from the frontline).[16] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil terminal is part of the Sheskharis transshipment system, the end point of the main oil pipelines in southern Russia, and that the oil terminal receives, accumulates, stores, and ships oil products through the Novorossiysk seaport. Geolocated footage published on June 7 and 8 shows fires near the Grushovaya oil terminal, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from June 8 shows heat anomalies at the oil terminal.[17] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters acknowledged on June 8 that a drone strike caused a fire at a transshipment facility in Novorossiysk.[18]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck and started a fire at the Krasnyy Yar linear production and dispatching station in Krasnyy Yar, Volgograd Oblast (roughly 350 kilometers from the international border), a part of the oil supply routes to the Volgograd Oil Refinery and the Sheskharis export terminal.[19] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that falling drone debris started a fire at the linear production and dispatch service building in Zhirnovsky Raion, which is where Krasnyy Yar is located.[20]
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that the June 6 Ukrainian strike against the Ust-Labinsk oil depot in Krasnodar Krai damaged the automobile loading and unloading overpass, fuel tanks, and two tanks with fuel and lubricants.[21]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike military assets, including air defense elements and locomotives, in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian radar station near Kabardinka, Krasnodar Krai (just southeast of Novorossiysk), a Russian drone control point near Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Kursk Oblast (roughly eight kilometers from the international border), and a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) command post near Volokonovka, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 22 kilometers from the international border).[22] Geolocated footage published on June 7 confirms the strike against a radar station near Kabardinka.[23] A Ukrainian regiment reported on June 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian locomotive that transports military cargo near Pantusov, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 40 kilometers from the international border).[24] Geolocated footage published on June 7 confirms the strike west of Pantusov.[25] Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows a drone strike against the Protasovo Airfield (roughly 470 kilometers from the international border) near Ryazan City.[26] Russian opposition source Astra noted that the airfield is home to the Protos Ryazan Research and Production Center, a drone development, production, and training facility.[27]
Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Sumy City. Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position southwest of Sopych (northwest of Sumy City), after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[28] Additional geolocated footage published on June 8 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions south of Pokrovka (southeast of Sumy City), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[29]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in Sumy Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Basivka (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 3.4 kilometers from the frontline) on June 7 or the night of June 7 to 8.[30]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 7 and 8 but did not make confirmed advances.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) and began fighting for the settlement.[32] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to exploit gaps in Ukrainian drone coverage near Kozacha Lopan to advance in the area.[33]
Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 7 and 8 but did not advance.[34]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions within and near Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows Russian servicemembers operating in southeastern Kupyansk and Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northeastern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[35]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position southwest of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[36]
Russian drone strikes continue to target Ukrainian police cars in frontline areas. The Kharkiv Oblast Police Department reported that Russian forces struck a police vehicle near Chystovodivka (west of Borova) on June 7 as police officers were responding to a call about an undetonated explosive device, killing one police officer and injuring three other officers and a civilian.[37]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Shchastsya (roughly 91 kilometers from the frontline).[38] Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a temporary deployment point of elements of the Russian 5th Cossack Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) in Shchastya, destroying the deployment point, headquarters, medical station, rear building, and an ammunition and fuel warehouse.[39] Geolocated footage published on June 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian fuel tanker near Pelahiivka (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline); a locomotive near occupied Dovzhansk (roughly 143 kilometers from the frontline); and substations near Hirne (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline), Pervomaiske (one of multiple settlements between 25 and 124 kilometers from the frontline), and Novookhtryka (roughly 62 kilometers from the frontline).[40]
Order of Battle: ISW last observed elements of the Russian 5th Cossack Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druhkivka tactical area in mid-February 2026.[41] Russian forces may have withdrawn the unit for rest and reconstitution in a rear area in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 7 and 8 but did not make confirmed advances.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Staryi Karavan (south of Lyman).[43]
Russian forces are trying to interdict Ukrainian supply routes and seize dominant heights to prepare the battlefield for future offensive operations against Slovyansk. The head of a Ukrainian air defense battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 7 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in the Slovyansk direction in the past month (since early May 2026) as spring foliage has created more concealment.[44] The air defense battalion head noted that Russian forces are trying to seize the dominant tactical heights near Kryva Luka, Zakitne, Rai-Oleksandrivka, and Ryznykivka (all east of Slovyansk) to create conditions for an offensive against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. An officer in a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are concentrating efforts in the Drobysheve direction (northwest of Lyman) in order to reach Svytohirsk (west of Drobysheve) and interdict the Ukrainian Slovyansk-Izyum supply route from the north.[45] The officer stated that Russian forces are also attacking in the Yampil direction (southeast of Lyman) where dense forests provide Russian forces with concealment to move to Mykolaivka (south of Lyman and southeast of Yampil). Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted three guided glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk on the afternoon of June 8.[46]
A prominent Russian milblogger cast doubt on the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) claimed seizures in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on June 8. The Russian MoD claimed on June 8 that Russian forces seized Molocharka (north of Kostyantynivka).[47] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD’s claim is “doubtful” as only small Russian groups are in Molocharka and do not control the settlement nor neighboring Novodmytrivka (just southeast of Molocharka).[48] The milblogger noted that the eastern flank of the Kostyantynivka direction suffers from greatly exaggerated reports of Russian battlefield successes, noting that heavy fighting continues in Mykolaivka (northwest of Molocharka) despite the Russian MoD’s claim in mid-May 2026 that Russian forces seized the settlement. The milblogger also complained that Russian forces are still trying to push Ukrainian forces from southern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka), which the Russian MoD claimed Russian forces seized in early December 2025. The milblogger added that claims that Russian forces have surrounded a Ukrainian garrison in northeastern Kostyantynivka are “far from reality.” The milblogger cautioned Russian forces against “rushing reports” and making false claims of advances, as these practices have repeatedly led to issues on various sectors of the frontline in the past. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Kostyantynivka.[49]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) on June 7 or overnight on June 7 to 8.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area and in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on June 7 and 8 but did not advance.[51]
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on June 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember west of Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Voskresenka (east of Oleksandrivka).[53]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Svobodne (either 95 or 85 kilometers from the frontline); a Russian personnel concentration near occupied Blahodatne (either 62 or 82 kilometers from the frontline); and a Russian material and technical warehouse near Zelene Pole (roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).[54] Geolocated footage published on June 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian military van on the M-30 Donetsk City-Luhansk City highway west of Yenakiyeve (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline).[55] Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a substation in occupied Mariupol.[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 7 and 8 but did not advance.[57]
Russian forces continue infiltration missions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[58] Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration near Stepnohirsk.[60]
Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against Russian logistics and military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 8 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Novobohdanivka (54 kilometers from the frontline) and Novoivanivka (one of multiple settlements between 59 and 85 kilometers from the frontline), a drone unit’s workshop near Burchak (about 20 kilometers from the frontline), and material and technical warehouses near Vasylivka (about 13 kilometers from the frontline).[61] Geolocated footage published on June 7 shows Ukrainian drone strikes against a Russian Osa air defense system south of Dmytrivske (about 28 kilometers on the frontline) and two tanker cars, potentially fuel tankers, north of Novopoltavka (about 35 kilometers from the frontline).[62]
Russian forces conducted limited ground operations east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on June 8 but did not advance.[63]
See topline text for reports about the Kinburn Spit.
Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian oil and railway infrastructure in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Atan Oil Depot in occupied Hvardiiske on the night of June 7 to 8.[64] The SSO noted that the Atan Oil Depot has 17 tanks for various types of fuel, a pumping station, and terminals for vehicle and railway accumulation, storage, and transit. A local Crimea-based Telegram channel published footage of Russian small arms fire failing to repel the strikes and claimed that the Ukrainian strikes caused explosions and a fire at the Atan Oil Depot.[65] The channel claimed that Ukrainian strikes also struck a railway transformer in occupied Hvardiiske, causing power outages along a railway line.[66]
Ukrainian forces are reportedly intensifying strikes against moving trains in occupied Crimea. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed on June 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a locomotive moving along the Moscow City-Simferopol railway line, prompting authorities to halt passenger train service in occupied Crimea.[67] Advisor to the Crimean occupation head, Oleg Kryuchkov, stated that authorities temporarily halted rail service between Krasnodar Krai, Russia and occupied Kerch and Simferopol, Crimea, though it is unclear if this refers only to passenger trains or all railway activity.[68] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger responded to the claimed railway strike, assessing that the more Ukrainian strikes disrupt logistics and the movement of people in southern occupied Ukraine, the more difficult it will be for Russian and occupation authorities to respond to these disruptions.[69]
Ukraine’s long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure and intermediate-range strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Ukraine continue to exacerbate gasoline shortages and disrupt Russian logistics in occupied Crimea. Crimean occupation authorities attempted to mitigate some of the effects of the ongoing gasoline shortages in occupied Crimea by requiring customers of the major Crimean gas station TES to use a QR code to purchase up to 20 liters (just over five gallons) of gasoline starting on June 6.[70] Crimean occupation authorities reported that available QR codes for June 7 sold out within two hours, and Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev similarly reported that residents claimed the available QR codes for June 7 within a few seconds, even though authorities released more codes on June 7 than on June 6.[71] Residents of Crimea continue to travel to nearby Russian territories to obtain gasoline, with a Telegram channel reporting on the Kerch Strait Bridge reporting lines of over 530 vehicles and a two hour wait time to cross the Kerch Strait Bridge from occupied Crimea on the afternoon of June 8.[72] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on June 8 that there are fuel supply problems in Crimea but claimed that Russian authorities are addressing the issues.[73]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 155 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones; Banderol-type loitering munitions; and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 124 drones, that 20 drones struck 17 locations, and that debris fell on six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, industrial, agricultural, energy, and transportation infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Odesa, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[75] DTEK, Ukraine’s largest energy company, reported on June 8 that Russian forces struck four DTEK energy facilities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast between June 6 and 8 and that the strike on the night of June 7 to 8 left more than 30,000 consumers without power.[76]
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with People’s Republic of China (PRC) Vice President Han Zheng as part of Han’s official visit to Belarus.[77]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/atesh_ua/10207
[2] https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1325139-partizanskij-ruh-ates-zaaviv-pro-vidhid-vijsk-rf-iz-kinburnskoi-kosi-so-kazut-u-silah-oboroni-pivdna/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-17/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-17/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-17/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_15-24/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_57/
[5] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-e3-leaders-statement-with-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-7-june-2026; https://suspilne dot media/1325465-zelenskij-merc-makron-ta-starmer-okreslili-umovi-dla-zaversenna-vijni-rf-proti-ukraini/
[6] https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-russian-drone-hits-extremely-critical-nuclear-facility-near-chernobyl-as-zelenskyy-expected-in-london-12541713?postid=11826294#liveblog-body; https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-russian-drone-hits-extremely-critical-nuclear-facility-near-chernobyl-as-zelenskyy-expected-in-london-12541713?postid=11826290#liveblog-body; https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-russian-drone-hits-extremely-critical-nuclear-facility-near-chernobyl-as-zelenskyy-expected-in-london-12541713?dcmp=snt-sf-twitter&fbclid=IwY2xjawSSnYJleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFEbE84RUxKaFR4ajFnbmlkc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHn22_BP1NWE-IeqyiSr5nT41LJxU37_TS_CKm2dMOUOrNoXC5HfsG8QsKCiX_aem_rENMOLsMKL-za4cWnm-oug
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/
[10] https://rtvi dot com/news/politicheskaya-smert-v-gd-oczenili-zayavlenie-liderov-evrotrojki-po-ukraine/
[11] https://x.com/Latvijas_armija/status/2063923504509059171
[12] https://rus dot delfi.lv/57860/latvia/120121710/obyavleno-preduprezhdenie-o-vozmozhnoy-ugroze-v-vozdushnom-prostranstve-ludzenskogo-balvskogo-i-aluksnenskogo-kraev
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695; https://www.facebook.com/UkrainianSOF/posts/pfbid02HocAongWffjWj2EcBZcU2CfDZvB1uewvb4LY9njtjzERW6hXyVudLTiXzyD9C7YWl?rdid=a4UfxPvYNoTLmUBt
[17] https://t.me/astrapress/115026; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2063819111042589164 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2063780164199195053 ; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@37.877,44.746,13.243z
[18] https://t.me/opershtab23/16241
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695
[20] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/27690785
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39688
[23] https://x.com/kimhvik2/status/2063778042728575278
[24] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1527466065768443; https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2063660116293943471
[25] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2063660116293943471; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063751029800280353
[26] https://t.me/astrapress/115091
[27] https://t.me/astrapress/115091; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/2063964158773633417; https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/775; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ukrayinskyj-dron-vluchyv-v-aerodrom-prostasovo-ryazanskoyi-oblasti/
[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12123; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1025296696500963
[29] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2063879169633591379; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2063879174373204013; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2063879175920820292; https://t.me/mod_russia/64361
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39667; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39665; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20879; https://t.me/wargonzo/34687; https://t.me/severnnyi/8334; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15603
[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43974
[33] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72772
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39667; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20879
[35] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2063987219099172957; https://t.me/kcaebirds/3030 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2063987219099172957; https://t.me/kcaebirds/3030 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2063874244111466844; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2063884170481307686; https://t.me/ombr43/3552
[36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12124; https://t.me/natiigne/79
[37] https://hk.npu.gov dot ua/news/zahynuv-vybukhotekhnik-politsii-ie-postrazhdali-slidchi-dokumentuiut-naslidky-voiennoho-zlochynu-viiskovosluzhbovtsiv-rf
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39688
[39] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2063660116293943471
[40] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2063660116293943471; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063765963065987086 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063763286932238527 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063760643098915077; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063755467831025820 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063749093025800676; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063746545778909404
[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2026/
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39702 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39667 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39665; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20879 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34687 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/18794
[43] https://t.me/rybar/80884
[44] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1325245-na-slovanskomu-napramku-rf-posilila-sturmi-na-limanskomu-namagaetsa-visnaziti-ukrainsku-oboronu-vijskovi/
[45] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1325245-na-slovanskomu-napramku-rf-posilila-sturmi-na-limanskomu-namagaetsa-visnaziti-ukrainsku-oboronu-vijskovi/
[46] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1325861-sonajmense-semero-poranenih-vijska-rf-atakuvali-aviabombami-slovansk/; https://t.me/Donetsk_obl_prokuratura/6024; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/08/udar-troma-fabamy-vorog-atakuvav-slovyansk-poraneno-devyatero-lyudej-sered-yakyh-pidlitok/; https://www.facebook.com/vadym.filashkin/posts/pfbid02WATk6s84eY8S2KmXy5smTueRpwLWfYd9FhFw5bFrUZW3Je4Kb2SAJi3E5r1sXQ3El
[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/64371
[48] https://t.me/rybar/80906
[49] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72764
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39702; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39667; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39665; https://t.me/wargonzo/34687; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116681;
[52] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2063758833604755884 ; https://t.me/Wormbusters/657 ; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2063799675757437422
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39688 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695
[55] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2063660116293943471; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063769848505586152
[56] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2063660116293943471; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063759274749165984
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39702 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14158 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39667; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14155 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39665 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34687
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39702 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14158; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39667; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14155; https://t.me/wargonzo/34687;
[59] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2063941098976719127; https://www.instagram.com/128_th/reel/DZT-BTJs_g1/
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39695
[62] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2063660116293943471; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063743629324161528; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2063748076666261829;
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39667; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14155
[64] https://www.facebook.com/UkrainianSOF/posts/pfbid02HocAongWffjWj2EcBZcU2CfDZvB1uewvb4LY9njtjzERW6hXyVudLTiXzyD9C7YWl?rdid=a4UfxPvYNoTLmUBt#
[65] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/101215; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/101263
[66] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/101212; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/101259;
[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/379698; https://t.me/tass_agency/379699; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/08/v-krymu-bespilotnik-udaril-po-poezdu-moskva-simferopol; https://t.me/Aksenov82/9676; https://t.me/tass_agency/379721; https://t.me/tass_agency/379727; https://t.me/tass_agency/379744; https://t.me/tavria_train/1598; https://t.me/tavria_train/1598;
[68] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8727122; https://t.me/kryuchkovoleg/1363 ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1094696
[69] https://t.me/rybar/80895
[70] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/
[71] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/08/v-sevastopole-vveli-qr-kody-dlya-polucheniya-talonov-na-benzin-ih-vydayut-tolko-v-makse-oni-zakanchivayutsya-za-sekundy; https://t.me/razvozhaev/21333; https://t.me/razvozhaev/21329; https://t.me/razvozhaev/21328
[72] https://t.me/most_official/24699 ; https://t.me/most_official/24702
[73] https://ria dot ru/20260608/vlasti-2097694755.html
[74] https://t.me/kpszsu/64426
[75] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29685; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30021; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/65588; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30018; https://t.me/synegubov/22627; https://t.me/synegubov/22633; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4096; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4097; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4098; https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=10164457507058007&set=a.10150702218648007; https://t.me/igorsmelyansky/4933; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/21407; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16660; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2431; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16668; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2432; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16661; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/5334; https://t.me/SemenikhinArtem/10027; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/5336
[76] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4357
[77] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/; https://t.me/pul_1/21427; https://t.me/pul_1/21431; https://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-zajavil-o-pravilnosti-istoricheskogo-vybora-v-polzu-razvitija-sotrudnichestva-s-kitaem-785076-2026/
Assessment as of: 6:45 PM ET. Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET.
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