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Middle East
Iran & Proxies
Iran Update
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
Iranian statements regarding the contents of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) indicate that some terms of the agreement are at odds with stated US positions on the Strait of Hormuz in recent months. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed the contents of the MoU in an interview on Iranian state media on June 12.[1] Araghchi said that the MoU could change until the agreement is signed. The agreement has two parts: a first stage that deals with an “end to the war” on all fronts, a resumption of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, and economic benefits for Iran, including reconstruction funds, sanctions relief, release of frozen funds, and an end to the US blockade.[2] The second stage would deal with the nuclear issue and “one or two other [unspecified] issues.” Araghchi discussed the strait at length and noted that it is under Iranian and Omani sovereignty and that both countries will collect fees after the MoU. Iran will also manage the strait. Araghchi rejected the term “tolls” but defended Iran charging “service“ fees for passage through the strait, which is effectively an attempt to rebrand Iran’s protection racket as legal administration.[3] Araghchi added that Iran would provide safe passage through the strait for civilian vessels but create separate arrangements for military vessels.[4] This system of management is at odds with both US policy and long-established maritime legal precedence. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly said, for example, that the strait must be open with no fees or Iranian management.[5] A US official told Reuters that the agreement would “open” the strait, but an “open” strait under Iranian management would be very detrimental to US interests, as ISW-CTP has previously argued.[6] An “open” strait under Iranian management is not a return to the pre-war status quo and would mean that Iran has accomplished a key war aim.
Iran also continues to use force in an attempt to impose the reality that it controls the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on June 12 that US forces intercepted multiple Iranian drones targeting commercial vessels in the strait.[7] Iranian media separately reported explosions near Qeshm and Sirik islands and said the sounds came from warning shots that Iranian forces fired to enforce control over the strait.[8]
Other issues—like when Iran can access frozen funds and how much it will be able to access—remain an issue in negotiations as well. Iranian media reported on June 13 that Iran proposed releasing half of its frozen assets early and the rest in a final agreement, but the United States rejected this offer.[9] Qatar then reportedly proposed a $12 billion USD package, including $6 billion USD in Iranian assets in Qatar for humanitarian use and a separate $6 billion USD credit line that Iran would direct.[10] Iran and Qatar reportedly initiated two MoUs during Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf‘s visit to Doha on May 25, but the MoUs remain unsigned and depend on a final US-Iran agreement.[11] Trump separately stated on June 13 that “no money will exchange hands,” which conflicts with Iranian demands for the release of its frozen assets.[12]
There appear to be some disagreements between Iran and the United States over the Iranian nuclear program, but it is unclear what specific disagreements exist. Araghchi said that some US nuclear demands are “unacceptable.”[13] Trump said on June 13 that the agreement will prevent Iran from seeking a nuclear weapon by preventing Iran from enriching or procuring nuclear material.[14] The agreement, according to Trump, will also allow the United States to either ”go in and get” Iran’s HEU to down-blend or destroy the material in Iran or the United States.[15] This rendering of the agreement appears consistent with Araghchi’s articulation of the Iranian position, which is that Iran will only resolve the issue of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by down-blending the HEU within Iran.[16]
There are presumably other issues related to the nuclear program on which Iran and the United States do not agree. The two sides were at odds in April over the length of an enrichment moratorium, for example, with Iran accepting only a moratorium of five years and the United States pushing for a 20-year moratorium.[17]
Iran’s reported attempts to safeguard regarding its HEU stockpile further suggest that the regime is preserving its leverage before any second-stage nuclear talks. CNN reported on June 13, citing five sources familiar with US intelligence that Iran has “dramatically escalated” its efforts to seal off its HEU in recent weeks, including by collapsing tunnels and booby-trapping entrances to HEU storage areas with explosive mines.[18] These actions are most likely designed to make any military effort to seize the HEU more difficult.
Iran is likely attempting to structure the MoU and the phasing of a final agreement to reduce US leverage before later negotiations over the nuclear program. Iran is attempting to access at least some of its frozen assets early in the MoU process, for example, which would give it some economic relief before nuclear talks begin. This would decrease US leverage in the nuclear negotiations and enable Iran to more easily walk away. The release of these funds would also enable Iran to access more funds to reconstitute its military forces, which would improve its position if the United States or Israel decides to initiate military operations in the near future if negotiations fail.
Iranian media appears to be portraying a possible MoU as a tactical pause in the war rather than a final settlement. The Ghalibaf-affiliated Khorasan outlet argued on June 13 that the emerging agreement only aims to end the current war and does not resolve the underlying issues between Iran and the United States.[19] Khorasan claimed that the agreement would delay the “final battle” and give both sides time to rebuild offensive and defensive military capabilities and prepare for a larger war.[20] Islamic Development Organization (IDO)-affiliated outlet Mehr News Agency similarly argued that the main challenge will begin after the initial MoU is signed because the United States and Iran would still need to reach understandings on technical details, commitments, and implementation mechanisms.[21] An Iranian expert close to the regime stated that it is difficult to imagine that an initial MoU can lead to a final agreement given the technical, legal, and political complexities.[22] IRGC-affiliated newspaper Javan separately argued on June 12 that negotiation is not a means of repelling the enemy, it is a means of managing the enemy. The newspaper added that even if the probability of success with negotiations is low, the cost of not trying to negotiate may be greater than the cost of negotiating.[23] These statements suggest that regime actors are framing the possible MoU as a tactical wartime tool to manage expectations, extract early economic benefits, and postpone difficult issues to the second phase of the negotiations.
Araghchi’s readout of the MoU (see above) is largely consistent with IRGC-affiliated media’s readout of the latest possible agreement, which may indicate a growing consensus among Iranian regime leaders on Iran’s red lines for negotiations. The possible MoU, as outlined by Araghchi, includes several core Iranian red lines, including maintaining Iranian “management” over the strait and a complete end to the war in Lebanon—provisions that also appear in recent reporting from IRGC- and Islamic Development Organization-affiliated media.[24] This alignment is notable because the IRGC, particularly Vahidi and his inner circle, has consistently pushed for uncompromising, maximalist negotiating positions.[25] ISW-CTP continues to assess that Vahidi has an extremely strong position in the policy formation process and is winning the fight over war and negotiation policy in Tehran.[26] The Iranian negotiating team led by Araghchi previously clashed with this hardline faction in April after reportedly exceeding its mandate by discussing Iran’s nuclear program and signaling flexibility on Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance.[27] Senior leaders in Iran ultimately recalled the delegation.[28] The US delegation has repeatedly emphasized that internal divisions within Iran have complicated negotiations, arguing that the Iranian negotiating team lacked the authority necessary to approve a final agreement, which is further indication of the previous disagreements within the regime about its negotiating position.[29] That Araghchi’s June 12 readout and IRGC media’s account of the latest US-Iran MoU are very similar suggests that Vahidi or elements close to him may have successfully driven consensus on their preferred policy outcomes.
See topline section.
See topline section.
Nothing significant to report.
Nothing significant to report.
Hezbollah launched multiple drones at Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions in northern Israel on June 12 and 13.[30] The IDF reported on June 12 that a Hezbollah drone struck a military zone between Adamit and Aramshe, northern Israel.[31] Hezbollah then launched another drone that crossed into Israeli territory between Metula and Misgav Am, northern Israel, according to the IDF on June 13.[32] The IDF reported no significant damage or any casualties in either attack.[33] Hezbollah also claimed that it launched two fixed wing drones targeting the IDF Jal al Deir position in northern Israel on June 12.[34] Israeli political leaders and the IDF have repeatedly warned since June 1 that the IDF would strike Hezbollah targets in Beirut’s vicinity if Hezbollah attacks northern Israel.[35] US President Donald Trump has warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to follow through on plans to strike targets in Beirut, however.[36] Iran previously launched missiles at Israel on June 7 following Israeli strikes on a Hezbollah first-person view (FPV) drone headquarters in Beirut’s southern suburbs, which Israel conducted in response to a Hezbollah attack on northern Israel. Iran had threatened to target Israel if Israel struck Beirut’s southern suburbs prior to Iran’s attack on June 7.[37] Iran’s Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters similarly stated on June 8 that Iranian forces would inflict “much more severe and crushing measures” if the IDF continued to conduct operations against Hezbollah across Lebanon.[38]
The IDF is continuing to advance along two axes to seize key positions in southeastern and southwestern Lebanon. A senior Lebanese military official told the Associated Press on June 13 that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) units withdrew from a barracks in Kfar Tebnit, southeastern Lebanon, after the IDF issued evacuation warnings for the area and Israeli forces began operating there.[39] Israeli military correspondents and open-source intelligence accounts reported on June 13 that the IDF entered Kfar Tebnit and established positions on the nearby Ali al Taher Hill.[40] Kfar Tebnit and Ali al Taher are both located on high ground, which is favorable for observing Hezbollah ground force movements.[41] The IDF has identified ongoing Hezbollah preparations to defend and hold Nabatieh, according to an Israeli military correspondent on June 11.[42]
Hezbollah has continued to claim attacks with rockets and FPV drones targeting advancing Israeli forces around Majdal Zoun, southwestern Lebanon.[43] Local sources told Saudi media on June 13 that Israeli forces have advanced to the outskirts of Majdal Zoun.[44] The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah targets in Majdal Zoun with airstrikes and artillery over the past day to support the IDF’s reported advance on the town.[45]
Nothing significant to report.
[1] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/323603
[2] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/323603
[3] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/323603
[4] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/323603
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-calls-actions-not-words-after-us-officials-say-peace-deal-is-near-2026-05-29/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/
[7] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2065608055790637301
[8] https://t.me/mehrnews/386511
[9] https://www.rokna dot net/بخش-اخبار-سیاسی-74/1225723-چگونگی-بازگشت-میلیارد-دلار-به-ایران-قطر-اعلام-کرد
[10] https://www.rokna dot net/بخش-اخبار-سیاسی-74/1225723-چگونگی-بازگشت-میلیارد-دلار-به-ایران-قطر-اعلام-کرد
[11] https://www.rokna dot net/بخش-اخبار-سیاسی-74/1225723-چگونگی-بازگشت-میلیارد-دلار-به-ایران-قطر-اعلام-کرد
[12] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116743808155352167
[13] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/323603
[14] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116743808155352167
[15] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116743808155352167
[16] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/323603
[17] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/917559 ;
https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2026/4/14/why-are-the-us-iran-arguing-over-duration-of-uranium-enrichment-ban
[18] https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/13/politics/iran-sealed-uranium-cache-tunnels-placed-mines
[19] https://www.tabnakdot ir/fa/news/1378795 ; https://www.asriran dot com/fa/amp/news/1170011
[20] https://www.tabnakdot ir/fa/news/1378795 ; https://www.asriran dot com/fa/amp/news/1170011
[21] https://t.me/mehrnews/386564
[22] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/2065540615010734228?s=20
[23] https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/1363380
[24] https://nournewsdot ir/fa/news/323603 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/422058 ; https://t.me/mehrnews/386296 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-june-12-2026#_edn75da4af7c1a5c1fd47a77005e24afb002
[25] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-28-2026
[26] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-june-12-2026#_edn75da4af7c1a5c1fd47a77005e24afb003
[27] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604149552?source=share-link ; https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2043620970875732026?s=20 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-april-24-2026#_edn8a2661535857a7010c99b41df9ebcb7e5
[28] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604149552?source=share-link
[29] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/20/trump-iran-deal-confusion
[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2065521759906881616 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2065677896874693058 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/17366
[31] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2065521759906881616 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2065522799209537921
[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2065677896874693058 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2065760214641467629
[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2065521759906881616 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2065677896874693058
[34] https://t.me/mmirleb/17366
[35] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/a9ox6bc30 ; https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2061531296396882334?s=20 ; https://x.com/IDF/status/2063677378107466039?s=20
[36] https://www.axios.com/2026/06/07/trump-israel-iran-missile-attack ; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-eyes-iranian-assets-gulf-allies-reconstruction-source-says-2026-06-06/
[37] https://t.me/presstv/192252 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-8-2026/
[38] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/5818676
[39] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-iran-hezbollah-7423a633aad2c74378e3024110af0a09 ; ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2065676197959274966 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2065746403356262454 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/31720
[40] https://t.me/moriahdoron/31720 ; https://x.com/syria7ra/status/2065715817421906364 ; https://x.com/ItayBlumental/status/2065747054085734467 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2065550778987610590 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2065566278526370179 ;
[41] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1537350/tense-night-in-south-lebanon-israeli-army-threatens-residents-of-maghdoucheh-near-saida.html
[42] https://t.me/moriahdoron/31668
[43] https://t.me/mmirleb/17376 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/17377
[44] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5283679-تقدّم-إسرائيلي-بمحيط-مدينتي-النبطية-وصور-بجنوب-لبنان
[45] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5283679-تقدّم-إسرائيلي-بمحيط-مدينتي-النبطية-وصور-بجنوب-لبنان ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7054 ; https://t.me/sameralhajali/7131 ; https://t.me/MTVLebanoNews/74164
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