Opinion
Tankers and cargo vessels are seen in the Gulf of Oman, along shipping routes linking the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea | File Image
The Strait of Hormuz closed on 28 February 2026. By March, global oil markets had convulsed. Brent crude surged to near US$126 a barrel, against roughly US$70 in the weeks before, a shock that reverberated through every energy-dependent economy on the planet. For the first 48 hours, India tracked the crisis with necessary urgency: crude imports blocked, LPG supplies cut, petrol pumps facing real supply questions, industrial capacity confronting fuel shortages, power stations and fertiliser plants facing allocation decisions. Airline operations came into question. The coverage was correct; the alarm was justified.
Yet beneath the headline crisis, something else was unfolding. Those who had followed India’s energy strategy over the preceding decade understood a layered reality: the country had built resilience to absorb this blow without the cascading consequences that would have crippled it five years earlier. The story was not one of luck or policy genius deployed overnight. It was the story of methodical construction over years.
India’s crude supplier base had expanded from 27 nations in 2006-07 to 41 by 2026, a shift that meant when the Strait closed, the country was not dependent on a single chokepoint for energy survival. Suppliers from the Atlantic basin, West Africa, and the Americas had been actively cultivated as alternatives to Gulf geographic dominance. When one route closed, others activated. Within days of the closure, non-Hormuz crude sourcing rose from roughly 55% of imports to approximately 70%, a transition that demonstrated diversification was operational capacity, not theoretical optionality. LPG import terminals had grown from 11 in 2014 to 22, building storage and diversification into the physical infrastructure itself, with significant capacity in southern and eastern coastal regions. The underlying national network, 24 refineries, more than 54,000 kilometres of hydrocarbon pipelines, more than 1 lakh petrol pumps, operated as the circulatory system of the state, not a collection of isolated assets. Domestic natural gas output had risen to roughly 90 million standard cubic metres per day, creating cushion against imported LNG volatility. When the closure occurred, India maintained roughly 60 days of crude and LNG reserves plus 45 days of LPG, a buffer designed to weather precisely this kind of shock. These specific numbers mattered because they meant the government could act without panic and companies could reroute supply without chaos. The absence of visible crisis at the petrol pump was not an accident; it was evidence that advance preparation had met the moment of immediate demand.
What followed were policy decisions that revealed how closely the government had mapped energy sector vulnerabilities and prepared tiered responses. The LPG Control Order of 8 March directed refineries to maximise yields; domestic LPG production lifted from 35 TMT per day to 54 TMT per day, with refineries that had never made LPG reconfigured to do so, a transformation that speaks to the technical capacity embedded in the refinery network waiting for a margin signal to pivot. The Natural Gas (Supply Regulation) Order of 9 March, issued under the Essential Commodities Act, held domestic PNG, CNG, and LPG production and essential pipelines at 100% of the previous six months’ average; industrial users received allocations up to 80%; fertiliser plants 70%; refineries capped at 65%. This tiered structure reflected sophisticated understanding of which sectors were essential to national interests and which could absorb temporary reductions without triggering systemic damage. Cooking fuel reaches households; city gas networks move people and goods; fertiliser feeds the crop calendar but with some elasticity; refineries can operate below optimal capacity during the disruption. The ordering was deliberate, not arbitrary.
Oil marketing companies carried losses towards Rs 1 lakh crore this quarter, on top of Rs 30,000 crore committed the previous year to hold cooking-gas prices; this cost was borne by the state and the govt insulated citizens. As the shock hit, one major economy drew down nearly 80 million barrels from its strategic reserve and another capped fuel prices for the first time in three decades; India deployed neither drawdown nor price control, instead absorbing losses through its exchequer. An excise duty cut of Rs 10 per litre on petrol, implemented in late March, absorbed Rs 210 crore daily in exchequer costs. Export levies of Rs 21.5 per litre on diesel and Rs 29.5 per litre on air fuel protected domestic supply whilst allowing some fiscal recovery. The Ujjwala cylinder price in Delhi held steady at Rs 642 throughout the crisis; the state absorbs roughly Rs 700 per cylinder, with the import-linked cost exceeding Rs 1,600. Consumer-facing inflation was deliberately limited by absorbing losses into the exchequer, a choice that transformed a supply crisis into a fiscal challenge rather than an economic cascade.
The diplomatic dimension was equally structural to the outcome. Sources in the govt say Prime Minister Modi conducted direct outreach to the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, and Israel, treating energy security as a matter of bilateral state relations rather than market mechanics. The External Affairs Minister articulated India’s governing principles: support for peace, restraint, a return to dialogue; safety of the Indian community as paramount; and the defence of India’s national interests in energy security and trade flows. On 26 March, India secured a Hormuz vessel exemption for Indian-flagged ships, a status granted to only five nations globally and representing the most concrete operational achievement of the diplomatic campaign. By 6 April, nine India-flagged vessels had transited, including the LPG carrier Green Asha. This simultaneous execution of energy management and human security, including the safe return of more than 375,000 Indians from West Asia whilst managing the fuel crisis, demonstrated that handling acute shortage did not exhaust India’s institutional capacity to deal with parallel challenges. India declined to join a proposed multinational naval coalition, instead establishing Operation Urja Suraksha with Indian Navy escorts in the Gulf of Oman, a choice reflecting India’s strategic assessment that bilateral relationships with Gulf partners were more reliable than coalition-based structures. India joined UK-led talks to reopen the Strait, signalling commitment to international de-escalation whilst maintaining independent operational posture.
The deeper lesson of those first 100-plus days pointed towards what strategic preparation actually means in operational reality. Strategic preparation does not rest on heroic decision-making when crisis strikes. It rests on methodical work: building terminals, diversifying supplier relationships, cultivating regional partnerships, and maintaining strategic reserves before disruption arrives. When the Strait closed, India’s energy system did not require innovation; it required execution of plans prepared in advance. That petrol kept flowing in pumps, consumers were insulated from sustained price inflation, no industrial sector faced unmanaged rationing was not evidence that the crisis was less real. It was evidence that policymakers had understood the vulnerability years earlier and constructed appropriate defences. The visible calm reflected invisible, years-long preparation.
For other nations in Asia facing similar vulnerabilities, the Indian case offers a sharp lesson in what resilience actually costs and what it actually delivers. Energy security cannot be purchased through emergency diplomacy or crisis response alone. It must be built through years of unglamorous work: terminal development, supplier cultivation, regional diplomatic relationships nurtured in quiet times, strategic reserves maintained at significant fiscal cost when markets seemed benign. When the Hormuz closure tested India’s resilience, the country did not depend on fortune or improvisation. It just avoided panic and used tools like diplomacy, planning & strategic moves to secure a nation of 1.4 billion.
Navika Kumar is Times Group Editor-in-Chief
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