‘The flip side of this is that he won’t hesitate to call out India if he thinks its policies are hurting US economic interests or border US foreign policy goals.’
After the recent friction in India-US relations, there was considerable interest in the Trump-Modi meeting in France on the sidelines of the G-7 summit.
But the meeting gave no indication of a reset in the background of an unfinished trade deal and the recent killing of three Indian seamen in a US strike near the Strait of Hormuz.
“Trump appears to genuinely like Modi, and that showed during their meeting. But as effective as the personal diplomacy might have been — and Trump revels in the art of personal diplomacy — it doesn’t have the capacity to make the relationship’s many tensions magically go away,” says Michael Kugelman, senior fellow, Asia Atlantic Council and a foreign policy expert on South Asia.
“There is a strong trust gap in New Delhi that I fear the White House is not properly acknowledging,” he tells Rediff‘s Archana Masih.
After renaming it the US Indo-Pacific Command in 2018, why has the US reverted to calling it the US Pacific Command? What is behind this changing position?
Has the strategic significance of the subcontinent, particularly India, altered for the US?
What’s most important here is not why the move was made, but rather the signal it sends.
For nearly two decades, going back to the Obama administration, there has been a consistent US posture, which transcends partisan lines, that the Indian Ocean is a significant strategic space for US interests.
Ever since the publication of Robert Kaplan’s Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power back in 2010, US policymakers have realised that the US can’t afford to let the importance of the Pacific Ocean eclipse the significance of the IOR (Indian Ocean Region).
In that sense, what’s happened now appears to fly in the face of nearly two decades of US policy.
How does this impact the strategic and geopolitical relevance of the Quad grouping?
I wouldn’t overstate the implications for the Quad. The Quad has had its own recent challenges, but they are mainly tied to problems in US-India relations.
A large multilateral organisation will only be minimally affected by tensions between two of its members. But for a small minilateral grouping like the Quad, you’re not going to be very effective if half of your members are sparring.
The future strategic and geopolitical relevance of the Quad comes down to the Trump administration’s approach to China. While its members never acknowledge so publicly, the Quad is at its core a mechanism meant to counter China.
If the Trump administration believes that China is no longer the strategic threat that it used to be — something that its first national security strategy appears to suggest, with its emphasis on closer-to-home threats — then this could make the Quad less appealing in the administration’s eyes.
But given Trump’s general worldview, it’s hard to imagine he would ever NOT think of China as a strategic competitor — at least in an economic context –which suggests that, despite everything, Washington will still want to be a part of a viable Quad. But given the ambiguity that has marked the administration’s approach to China, it may be some time before there’s clarity on this.
Where do you think India’s fits in Trump’s transactional world view?
Trump genuinely likes India, despite the critical comments he’s made over the years about its dirty air, its high tariffs, and so on. He understands the significance of the US-India economic partnership, the potential for Indian investment in American jobs and the wider economy, and the size and influence of the Indian diaspora.
In that sense, even if Trump doesn’t view India as a strategic partner — and let’s be clear, given his transactional world view, there are few if any countries he views as strategic partners — he still accords importance to India.
Of course, the flip side of this is that he won’t hesitate to call out India if he thinks its policies are hurting US economic interests or border US foreign policy goals — and that can range from Indian tariffs on US goods to its purchases of Russian energy.
What are your primary takeaways from the Modi-Trump meeting in France last week?
It was a symbolically significant meeting because it marked the first time the two leaders met face-to-face since their White House summit in February 2025, when the relationship was in a much better place and there were strong expectations that it would grow even more.
Otherwise, there’s nothing to write home about. Trump offered a reminder of the strong chemistry he has with Modi, though I also noticed that the body language wasn’t as warm as it’s been in the past — perhaps a reflection of how things have changed since their last meeting, and really since all their previous meetings, when bilateral ties were very good.
But ultimately, Trump appears to genuinely like Modi, and that showed during their meeting.
But as effective as the personal diplomacy might have been — and Trump revels in the art of personal diplomacy — it doesn’t have the capacity to make the relationship’s many tensions magically go away.
This is why there was never any reason to think that the Modi-Trump meeting would reset the relationship. There is a strong trust gap in New Delhi that I fear the White House is not properly acknowledging.
Sergio Gor’s positivity and energy has certainly helped bring a healthier tone to the relationship since he arrived in New Delhi. But there are so many US positions that have rankled India, and until the US changes or ends them, it’s hard to imagine the relationship recovering.
This ranges from Trump’s tight embrace of Pakistan, his ambigious views toward China, and the broader sense that he doesn’t view India as a strategic partner.
What is your interpretation of the statement by Trump about Modi — ‘If anyone attacks this man, I will be there for him. Not sure if someone else is the leader.’
Is it personal praise for the PM or does it mean the future course of India-US relations is linked to Modi’s leadership?
I see it as a reminder of the personal affinities that Trump has for Modi. It also reflects Trump’s limited exposure to India’s political leadership: The only Indian leader he knows is Modi.
This isn’t Trump’s fault, as this is a function of Modi’s political strength and longevity. But Trump naturally wouldn’t want to pledge support for a leader he doesn’t know.
Does the US meeting with Trump indicate a reset in India-US relations, especially after the killing of Indian seamen in a US missile attack on their ship?
Or do you think India will be wary of trusting Trump as the trade deal hangs in the balance and after the recent friction in Indo-US relations?
There will be a wariness in Delhi for quite some time, given a desire not to do anything that risks ruffling Trump’s feathers or provoking him.
Trump’s unpredictability will also make him tough to trust, in Delhi’s eyes.
There may also be something else at play that results in a cautious approach: A sense of buyer’s remorse. There was a sense of confidence, even triumphalism, in New Delhi after Trump’s re-election, rooted in a sense that India understands Trump and knows how to manage him, as evidenced by how bilateral ties remained warm during Trump’s first term.
But now, in the Trump 2.0 era, India has found itself in a difficult spot with the US.
This is all to suggest that New Delhi will proceed slowly, and play a long game, with the hope that eventually, even if it’s after Trump is no longer in power, that the relationship will bounce back.
And let’s be clear, for all the public commentary and social media noise about India not needing the US, this is a critical partnership for Delhi. The US remains a top destination for Indian exports, and the US has shared critical intelligence that has helped India prevent provocations on its borders.
From India’s perspective, does Pakistan’s diplomatic visibility create strategic concerns, or is India confident that its own economic strength, global partnerships, and geopolitical importance will outweigh any gains that Pakistan makes?
Pakistan is enjoying an extended geopolitical moment in the sun, but it is just that, a moment.
In the coming months, after all have moved on from the Iran war and other events in the Middle East, Pakistan’s global prominence will endure — but certainly not at the cost of India.
And that’s because at the end of the day, India is a much more globally consequential actor than is Pakistan — because of its size, its economic clout, and its partnerships.
Additionally, if the Mideast stays calm, India will be a big player in new geoeconomic and geopolitical trends that could unfold there — from the India-Middle East-Europe Economic corridor to the I2U2 [India, Israel, UAE, USA] quad.
Broadly speaking, so long as India continues to be the fastest-growing major economy and one of the top five economies on the whole, it’s going to remain a global player to be reckoned with — no matter how much Pakistan might do to bolster its own global clout.
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