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Russia & Ukraine
Ukraine
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
British forces intercepted a Russian shadow fleet vessel in the English Channel for the first time on June 14. United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated on June 14 that British forces intercepted a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker attempting to pass through the English Channel.[1] The British Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on June 14 that British forces intercepted the UK-sanctioned crude oil tanker Smyrtos, which was flying the Cameroonian flag, marking the first time the UK has intercepted a shadow fleet vessel.[2] The British MoD noted that British officials will provisionally move the Smyrtos to an anchorage off the South Coast of England and will monitor it for safety concerns. Russian investigative opposition source The Insider reported, citing data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform, that several Russian shadow fleet tankers bound for the English Channel abruptly changed course after the UK detained the Smyrtos.[3] European states have been increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers in 2026.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued EU efforts against the Russian shadow fleet will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil.[5]
US President Donald Trump spoke with both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 14. Zelensky reported on June 14 that he had a phone conversation with Trump about peace negotiations, the latest developments on the battlefield, and how Ukraine’s position has strengthened.[6] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on June 14 that Trump and Putin had a phone conversation and discussed the war in Ukraine and the situation in Iran, and that Trump emphasized the need to end the war in Ukraine.[7]
The Russian military command is reportedly planning to relocate remaining Black Sea Fleet (BSF) command structures out of occupied Crimea. Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group Atesh reported on June 14 that its agents in the headquarters of the BSF reported that the BSF military command is planning to relocate its remaining command structures currently based in occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, as BSF headquarters are steadily losing functionality amid severe logistics issues due to Ukraine’s intensified strike campaign against Crimea.[8] Atesh agents reported that some officers are already moving their families out of Sevastopol and selling non-movable assets ahead of expected future orders. Russia is increasingly struggling to conduct logistics into occupied Crimea, with the Russian military command of the Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) reportedly prohibiting military cargo traffic along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea and the A-291 Kerch — Simferopol — Sevastopol Tavrida highways as of June 7.[9] ISW is unable to verify Atesh’s report at this time, but ISW has increasingly observed evidence that Ukrainian strikes are inhibiting Russian logistics into occupied Crimea.[10]
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure within Russia. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Azot Chemical Plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast.[11] Brovdi noted that the plant produces explosive materials, including nitric acid, acetic acid, and ammonium nitrate, for use in artillery shells, bombs, and missiles. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data published on June 14 shows heat anomalies at the plant.[12] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck an industrial enterprise in Novomoskovsk.[13] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Temp Oil Depot in Rybinsk, Yaroslavl Oblast, causing large fires at the oil tank farm, which has over 60 storage tanks.[14] The SBU reported that the oil depot is part of the Russian State Material Reserve system and stores gasoline, diesel, and other fuels and lubricants to supply northeastern Russian oblasts and strategic fuel reserves for Russian forces. Geolocated footage published on June 14 shows fires at the oil depot.[15] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi assessed on June 14 that the oil depot in Rybinsk has strategic importance to Russia, as it is a reserve facility designed to store inviolable fuel and petroleum product reserves for use in war, large scale crisis, and emergencies, and that each tank has a capacity of up to 5,000 cubic meters.[16] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Yevrayev acknowledged that drones struck industrial fuel storage facilities in Yaroslavl Oblast.[17]
Ukrainian forces continued frontline strikes against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near Nekislitsa and a Russian manpower concentration near Troyebortnoye (both northwest of Sumy City along the international border).[18]
Ukrainian sources provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) for recent Ukrainian strikes against Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukraine’s June 13 strike against the Tamanneftegaz oil and gas terminal in Taman, Krasnodar Krai, damaged three RVS-30000 oil tanks, a pipeline, and bulk standers at berths number five and six.[19]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest, northeast, and southeast of Sumy City on June 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[20] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Bachivsk (northwest of Sumy City) and southeast of Bachivsk.[21]
Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 13 that elements of the Russian “116th Regiment,” possibly referring to the 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade, are operating near Bachivsk.[22] ISW has previously observed elements of the 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade operating near Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[23]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 14 that Russian forces completed the seizure of Vovchansk and advanced south of Vovchansk and Zybyne (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[25] The Russian military command claimed that Russian forces had seized Vovchansk as of December 2, 2025.[26]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Vovchansk on June 13 or overnight on June 13 to 14.[27]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 14.
Russian forces reportedly recently conducted a motorized assault in the Kupyansk direction but did not advance. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on June 14 that elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) conducted an unsuccessful company-sized motorized assault on Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) using 10 vehicles on an unspecified recent date.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Shyikivka (east of Borova).[29]
Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counterattacks in the Borova direction. The source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on June 14 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova) and have recaptured most of the settlement.[30]
Geolocated footage published on June 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Stelmakhivka (northeast of Borova and roughly 11 kilometers from the frontline).[31]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian heavy drone ammunition workshop near occupied Sokolohirsk (formerly Pervomaisk) (roughly 49 kilometers from the frontline) and a manpower concentration near occupied Malokostyantynivka (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline) on June 13 or overnight on June 13 to 14.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 14 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[33] Geolocated footage published on June 13 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northeastern Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[34]
Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in southern Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on June 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in southern Kostyantynivka despite Russian forces infiltrating throughout much of the city.[35] Russian and Ukrainian forces likely continue to hold co-located positions within much of Kostyantynivka as Russian forces continue infiltration missions and likely have not consolidated many positions. Ukrainian servicemembers operating in the Kostyantynivka area reported that there were only between 100 and 250 Russian servicemembers in Kostyantynivka as of June 12, a relatively small number of personnel relative to the number of observed locations of Russian servicemembers throughout the city.[36] The small number of Russian personnel reported within the city and the presence of Ukrainian forces in southern Kostyantynivka both indicate that Russian forces likely do not control many of the areas into which they have infiltrated.[37]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues informational efforts to exaggerate the Russian presence in Kostyantynivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 14 that elements of the Russian 3rd and 8th combined arms armies (CAAs, both Southern Military District [SMD]) and 3rd Army Corps (AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) seized 117 buildings in Kostyantynivka between June 13 and 14.[38] The Russian MoD does not usually post this level of tactical detail about alleged Russian successes in the Kostyantynivka direction, and the June 14 claims are likely part of an ongoing information effort to aggrandize tactical progress. The Russian MoD made similar claims on June 13 and may continue such claims in the coming days and weeks as part of this informational effort.[39] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger warned on June 13 that it is premature to expect Russian forces to seize Kostyantynivka in the coming weeks, as Russian forces must also attack Kostyantynivka from the east, and because Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Chasiv Yar and Chervone (both northeast of Kostyantynivka), preventing Russian forces from reaching Kostyantynivka from the east.[40] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s ability to defend Kostyantynivka is deteriorating but that Russian sources appear to be curating their claims about Russian advances in order to create the perception that the Russian presence in the city is more widespread than it actually is.[41]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian material and technical warehouse near Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka).[42]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 14 but did not advance.[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest and southwest of Pokrovsk on June 14 but did not advance.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Novoekonomichne (north of Pokrovsk).[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 14 but did not advance.[46]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on June 13 shows Ukrainian forces operating in multiple positions northeast and east of Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka), north of Zaporizke (south of Ternove), and in southeastern Novoheorhiivka (southeast of Ternove), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely advanced northeast and east of Ternove and liberated Novoheorhiivka and Berezove (west of Novoheorhiivka and southwest of Ternove).[47] The footage also indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Novohryhorivka (south of Oleksandrivka).[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Oleksandrivka direction and have penetrated between five and eight kilometers in depth near several unspecified villages simultaneously.[49] Another milblogger expressed concern that Ukrainian forces may soon enter Komar (northeast of Ternove and southeast of Oleksandrivka).[50]
Ukrainian forces continue intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets and are interdicting Russian logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian field artillery depot near Pryazovske (101 kilometers from the frontline) and a personnel concentration near Bahatyr (16 kilometers from the frontline).[51] Ukrainian Telegram sources that frequently report on Ukrainian strikes in occupied Ukraine and Russia reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian railway depot in occupied Ilovaisk (85 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on June 13 to 14.[52] Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian fuel tanker truck along the T-0507 Amvrosiivka-Khartsyzk highway near Zhukova Balka (about 107 kilometers from the frontline).[53]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction as Russian forces conducted infiltration missions northwest of Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on June 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole).[54] Additional geolocated footage published on June 14 shows Russian forces operating southwest of Kosivtseve and in southeastern Vozdvyzhivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Orikhiv direction on June 14 but did not advance.[56]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Orikhiv direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Zherebyanky (southwest of Orikhiv and roughly three kilometers from the frontline) on June 13 or overnight on June 13 to 14.[57]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on June 13 and 14 but did not advance.[58]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Hola Prystan (southwest of Kherson City) during the day on June 13 or overnight on June 13 to 14.[59]
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on June 14 that Russian forces launched 98 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[60] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 91 drones, that seven drones struck six locations, and that debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, industrial, transport, and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Sumy oblasts.[61] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on June 14 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders responding to a prior Russian strike in Putyvlya, Sumy Oblast, but that the second strike caused no casualties.[62] The Ukrainian Ministry of Community and Territorial Development reported on June 14 that Russian drones struck the Lozova railway station in Kharkiv Oblast and injured two train conductors.[63]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 14 that Russian forces launched about 17 missiles, 1,920 long-range strike drones, and 1,790 guided glide bombs against Ukraine in the past week (June 7 to June 13).[64]
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://x.com/Keir_Starmer/status/2066039805679448546
[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-forces-intercept-russian-shadow-fleet-vessel-for-the-first-time-in-blow-to-putins-war-chest
[3] https://theins dot ru/news/293689
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/
[6] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19473
[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80030
[8] https://t.me/atesh_ua/10310
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/
[11] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2482 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2073
[12] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:2026-06-13;@38.198,54.087,13.997z ; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/goryt-himzavod-azot-u-novomoskovsku-pislya-urazhennya-dronamy/
[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/380557; https://t.me/dmilyaev/16273
[14] https://t.me/SBUkr/17799; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/14/try-oseredky-pozhezhi-j-ponad-60-rezervuariv-sbu-rozkryla-podrobyczi-udaru-po-naftobazi-rf/
[15] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7674 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2066028163918876791; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2066029208879485376; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/22772; https://x.com/igorsushko/status/2066049460808118628?s=20; https://x.com/DefenceU/status/2066086730537529395; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2066127428913643968?s=20; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2066141029271507241?s=20; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2066140620935004413?s=20 https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2066056046049730624 ;https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/2066126793623351784; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/22788
[16] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ukrayinski-drony-urazyly-naftobazu-rosrezervu-v-rybinsku-yaroslavskoyi-oblasti/
[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/380565V
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39939
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39939 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2026/
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39940 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39916 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39914 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72871 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34800 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8400 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72872
[21] https://t.me/severnnyi/8400 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72871 ; https://t.me/divgen/81516
[22] https://t.me/divgen/81506
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39940 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39916 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39914 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34800
[25] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52738
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39939
[28] https://t.me/grvZapad/18867
[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/34800
[30] https://t.me/grvZapad/18868
[31] https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2066113782498144347; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2066060160523555201; https://t.me/rubaka_77/299
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39939
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39940 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39916 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39914 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34800 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/18863 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/174221
[34] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2065903018784985240; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2065904381963210837; https://t.me/TeamAvangard123/178
[35] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2066155322876506383?s=20; https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2066155600501715016?s=20; https://t.me/mod_russia_en/27526
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/
[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/64520
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2026/
[40] https://t.me/rybar/81046
[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39939
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39940 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39916 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39914
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39940 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39916 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39914 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34800
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39939
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39940 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39916 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39914 ;
[47] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2066093709360247128; https://t.me/voin_dv/19811; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12180; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2066093712682238055; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2066093716293435603; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2066102757266735255; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2066093720135495932; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2066093723327279509; https://t.me/voin_dv/19811
[48] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2066093712682238055; https://t.me/voin_dv/19811; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12180
[49] https://t.me/milinfolive/174221
[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52755
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39939
[52] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/22728; https://t.me/supernova_plus/53648; https://t.me/andriyshTime/60377
[53] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2066149281895997618; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2066149370911744346; https://t.me/ptichii_rai/789
[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12176; https://t.me/voin_dv/19804
[55] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12178; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2066145515767468510; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2001414313798089; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2066145505206304824; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2001414313798089
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39916; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39914; https://t.me/wargonzo/34800;
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39939
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39914 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39916
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39939
[60] https://t.me/kpszsu/65143
[61] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30160; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/26997 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30163 ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1330462-armia-rf-atakuvala-transportnu-ta-energeticnu-infrastrukturu-naslidki-atak-na-mikolaivsini/ ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1D1MybqK44/
[62] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/66070; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/14/dsns-pid-chas-gasinnya-pozhezh-u-putyvli-rosiyany-povtorno-vdaryly-po-misczyu-roboty-ryatuvalnykiv/
[63] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1cLmvzeKak/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1330644-rf-atakuvala-zaliznicnu-stanciu-v-lozovij-na-harkivsini-masinist-i-pomicnik-masinista-zaznali-poranen/
[64] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19469
Assessment as of: 6:00 PM ET, Data Cutoff: 12:45 PM ET
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