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Russia & Ukraine
Ukraine
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Ukrainian forces have largely halted the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive so far, and Russian forces in May 2026 have gained a presence in only a fraction of the territory they did in May 2025. ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces gained control of or infiltrated 40.64 square kilometers between December 2025 and May 2026. Russian forces, however, lost 281.1 square kilometers in the same time period when only considering territory that Russian forces control. (ISW’s infiltration layer shows areas in which Russian forces — sometimes very small groups of a few soldiers — have infiltrated and maintain a limited presence interspersed with Ukrainian positions but do not control.) ISW calculations show that Russian forces lost control of about 281 square kilometers in part due to the fact that ISW recodes areas in the Russian advances layer to infiltrations when new evidence allows ISW to reassess the level of control Russian forces maintain over an area. ISW’s calculations that the Russian forces lost control of 281 square kilometers thus do not inherently mean that Ukrainian forces liberated that amount of territory.
Comparisons of Russia’s gains in 2025 with the same period last year show that Russia’s gains have slowed significantly, even when including Russian infiltrations. Russian forces advanced into 515.84 square kilometers from December 2024 to May 2025, compared to the 40.64 square kilometers into which they advanced or infiltrated in the same time period in 2025-2026. Russian forces thus seized or infiltrated into only 7.87 percent as much territory in 2026 as they advanced into in 2025. (Russian forces were not widely using infiltration tactics in early 2025, and ISW therefore did not have a Russian infiltration layer at that time.) Russia’s year-on-year performance statistics significantly worsen when comparing only areas in which ISW assesses that Russian forces exert control: the 515.84 square kilometers they seized in early 2025 compares poorly with the net loss of 281.1 square kilometers they suffered in the same period this year.
Other sources with different methodologies are also recording a slow Russian rate of advance in May 2026. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on June 1 that Russian forces occupied only 14 additional square kilometers of territory in May 2026.[1] The source noted, however, that it has delayed publishing information about Ukrainian advances due to security reasons and that Russia’s advances in May were actually negative. The current battlefield situation, in which Ukrainian and Russian positions are often interspersed and the “kill zone” is expanding, makes precise calculations about Russian and Ukrainian gains and losses difficult. ISW’s methodology differs from that of the Ukrainian military intelligence-affiliated source, leading to different calculations about how many square kilometers Russian forces have seized in May. The source’s overall assessment is nonetheless consistent with ISW’s.
Russia’s declining gains appear to be unrelated to the seasonal weather shifts that traditionally hinder advances, but is likely the result of more comprehensive battlefield shifts in 2026. ISW assessed that Russian forces suffered a net loss of territory controlled in April 2026 but that this may have been in part related to annual seasonal patterns.[2] Russia’s April 2026 decline may have been related to the muddy rasputitsa season when snow melts and rains degrade conditions for mechanized movement. Russian forces have historically increased their advances in May and June as the ground dries — as was the case in 2025. Russian gains in May 2026, however, are not following a similar pattern, suggesting that Russia’s declining advances in 2026 have not been related to seasonal weather conditions. Russia’s slower advances are likely related to wider changes on the battlefield, including Ukrainian ground counterattacks, Ukrainian mid-range strikes, the February 2026 block on Russia’s use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s throttling of Telegram.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly resisting pressure to reduce defense spending and end his war against Ukraine, despite increased warnings from economic officials about the unsustainable strain his war effort is putting on the Russian economy. Bloomberg reported on June 1, citing sources and documents that Bloomberg viewed, that senior Russian Ministry of Finance and Central Bank officials have told Putin that Russia’s current level of projected war spending is on an unaffordable path and risks dangerously widening the budget deficit.[3] The sources stated that the Russian officials have proposed defense spending cuts, but that some in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Kremlin are advocating against reduced defense spending in order to avoid damaging the many businesses that are reliant on military-related contracts. Sources stated that the Russian MoD is even demanding additional funding. The sources told Bloomberg that Putin has been aware of pressure in the Russian budget since last year but asked the Ministry of Finance to first find ways to reduce spending in non-defense sectors. Bloomberg reported that Russian officials drafted the 2026 budget, allowing for a possible 1.2 trillion to 1.5 trillion ruble (roughly $16.5 billion to $21 billion) deficit to emerge in the second half of the year because they hoped that the war would end, enabling Russia to spend less on defense. Sources told Bloomberg that oil revenue windfalls from the war in the Middle East will not be enough, as oil prices would need to stay above $100 per barrel for at least one year to improve the Russian economy. The sources noted that even such sustained high prices would not solve Russia’s structural issues affecting economic growth, inflation, and the banking sector. The Russian Ministry of Finance admitted on April 9 that the Russian budget deficit reached 4.58 trillion rubles (roughly $63.5 billion) in the first three months of 2026, already exceeding the planned deficit of 3.79 trillion rubles (roughly $52.5 billion dollars) for all of 2026.[4]
Putin’s unwillingness to cut defense spending and scale down his war effort suggests that Putin believes that he will be able to win the war in the near to medium term and that the Russian economy is able to hold on until then. ISW recently assessed that Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military’s successes in Ukraine based on heavily exaggerated claims from the Russian high military command.[5] Putin’s misunderstanding of the battlefield situation is likely contributing to his insistence that war spending remain high and to his commitment to continuing the war to achieve his goals militarily. Putin, in fact, faces a different problem, as reduced war spending would likely put sectors of the front at risk in the face of Ukrainian mid-range strike and counterattacks and allow Ukrainian forces to build upon their recent battlefield successes.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Satellite imagery provided more details about recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure. Satellite imagery published on June 1 shows damage to the Balakhonikhinskaya Oil Pumping Station in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast after a reported Ukrainian drone strike on an unspecified date.[6] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Schemi project published satellite imagery collected on May 31 indicating that Ukrainian strikes on May 29 to 30 damaged at least one of the fuel tanks of the Armavir Oil Depot in Krasnodar Krai.[7] RFE/RL noted that a tank that Ukrainian strikes damaged in March 2026 remains inoperable.
Russian forces continued offensive operations north and southeast of Sumy City on June 1 but did not advance.[8]
Ukrainian forces likely hold positions in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[9] A Ukrainian non-commissioned officer operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on June 1 that Ukrainian forces still hold positions on the outskirts of Vovchansk, contrary to Russian claims of having completely seized the town.[10]
Russian forces continued limited ground activity southeast of Velykyi Burluk on June 1 but did not advance.[11]
Russian forces conducted infiltration missions northeast and southeast of Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions west of Fyholivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and in western Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[12]
A Ukrainian brigade reported on June 1 that Ukrainian forces recently cleared Novoplatonivka (north of Borova) of Russian infiltrators.[13]Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian military vehicles near Novolyubivka (roughly eight kilometers from the frontline).[14]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[15] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced in Yarova (north of Lyman).[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Nykyforivka and Lypivka and advanced further west of Lypivka (both southeast of Slovyansk), north of Kryva Luka, and northeast of Rai-Oleksandrivka (both east of Slovyansk).[17]
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces refuted on June 1 Russian claims of seizing Stary Karavan and Brusivka (both south of Lyman).[18]
A Ukrainian drone company commander operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on June 1 that Russian forces continue to conduct small group infiltrations to accumulate forces near Ukrainian positions in the Slovyansk direction.[19] The officer reported that Russian forces mostly infiltrate during the night and infiltrate under concealment of foliage during the day.
Russian forces continued infiltrations within and near Kostyantynivka on June 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[20] Geolocated footage published on May 31 shows a Ukrainian airstrike against a Russian position in western Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Tykhonivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces somewhat intensified ground activity near Dovha Balka (west of Kostyantynivka) in recent days.[23]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 1 but did not advance.[24]
Ukrainian frontline drone activity in the Pokrovsk direction is reportedly hindering Russian efforts to accumulate in Pokrovsk and is blocking Russian troop rotations. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported on June 1 that Ukrainian drone strikes impeded Russian forces’ ability to accumulate personnel and weapons in the town in May 2026 and destroyed over 105 Russian artillery systems, twice as many as in April 2026.[25] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 1 that Ukrainian drone activity in the Pokrovsk direction is preventing Russian forces from conducting rotations to the frontline positions of their infiltration groups and therefore limiting their ability to advance.[26]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian forces infiltrated. Geolocated footage published on June 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[27] Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in the fields south of Hyrshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[28]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[29]
Russian forces continued limited ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on June 1 but did not advance.[30]
Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 31 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher near Sribne (roughly 8.5 kilometers from the frontline).[31]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 1 but did not advance.[32]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and fuel logistics assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade published footage and reported on June 1 that Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian forces’ logistics on the approaches to occupied Donetsk City.[33] Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows damage to a Russian fuel strike near occupied Vuhlehirsk (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline) after a reported Ukrainian strike.[34] Additional geolocated footage published on May 31 shows two destroyed Russian trucks parked near a border crossing at the Rostov-occupied Donetsk Oblast international border northeast of occupied Novoazovsk (roughly 145 kilometers from the frontline) after a reported Ukrainian strike.[35] A Russian milblogger responded to the Ukrainian strikes, calling for Russian authorities to build secure parking areas at checkpoints to protect Russian transport vehicles.[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[37]
Some Russian milbloggers continue to greatly exaggerate Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Lyubytske (northwest of Hulyaipole).[38] Lyubytske is roughly 11 kilometers away from ISW’s current furthest extent of Russian infiltrations and roughly 15 kilometers away from the furthest extent of Russian advances. Lyubytske is only 1.3 kilometers away from the furthest extent of Russian advances on a leaked Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) map of the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast dated April 9.[39] Many Russian milbloggers have complained about inaccurate official Russian reports that greatly exaggerate Russian claims of advance, but other milbloggers may continue to make claims that fall in line with the official greatly exaggerated claims.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Orikhiv on June 1 but did not advance.[41]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. A Ukrainian drone regiment operating in Zaporizhia Oblast reported on June 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian dry cargo ship twice in occupied Berdyansk (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline), likely on May 31.[42] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported an explosion in the area just after midnight on the morning of May 31 and assessed that the cargo ship likely carried ammunition at the time of the strike.[43]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on June 1 but did not advance.[44]
Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an apartment building in occupied Henichesk, Kherson Oblast (about 115 kilometers from the frontline), reportedly killing one civilian and injuring 11.[45]
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) personnel concentration in occupied Crimea on May 28. A Telegram channel claiming to be affiliated with Russian intelligence services claimed on June 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a base of the Russian 126th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], BSF) in occupied Perevalne, (about 258 kilometers from the frontline) on May 28, using two missiles and two jet-powered drones.[46] The Russian channel claimed that the strike damaged the barracks and mess hall, killed 15 Russian service members, and injured another 26 service members.
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 265 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[47] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 228 drones, that 27 drones struck 18 locations, and that debris fell on 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[48] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on June 1 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Odesa, Sumy, Kherson, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[49]
Russian forces are increasingly targeting Ukrainian railway infrastructure. Ukraine’s state rail company Ukrzaliznytsia reported on June 1 that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure and rolling stock 541 times during the first quarter of 2026, damaging 1,718 railway facilities, causing approximately $178 million in losses, and decreasing freight transportation volumes by 6.4 percent.[50] Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian rail logistics as part of a wider campaign to obstruct deliveries of Western aid within Ukraine and movement to and from the frontline more broadly.[51] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces have substantially improved their ability to strike moving targets with precision due to recent drone adaptations and improved reconnaissance capabilities.[52]
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23546
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/
[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-01/russia-finance-officials-tell-putin-war-spending-is-unaffordable
[4] https://minfin dot gov.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=40280; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/04/09/minfin-rf-neftegazovye-dohody-v-pervom-kvartale-upali-pochti-v-dva-raza-defitsit-byudzheta-prevysil-godovoy-plan
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[6] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2061312391212921267; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2061327212608143863
[7] https://t.me/cxemu/4830; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2026/
[8] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39397; https://t.me/dva_majors/93862; https://t.me/wargonzo/34548; https://t.me/severnnyi/8249
[9] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116170; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20804; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39397; https://t.me/dva_majors/93862; https://t.me/wargonzo/34548; https://t.me/severnnyi/8249;
[10] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1320223-rosiani-namagautsa-povtoriti-kupanskij-scenarij-vijskovij-58-i-ompbr-pro-situaciu-na-vovcanskomu-napramku/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/
[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20804;
[12] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12061; https://t.me/ngu_3005/8477; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2061321842703335567; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2061322248456134800; https://t.me/ombr43/3522
[13] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/01/shturm-iz-terminatorom-za-pidtrymky-nrk-nashi-bijczi-zachystyly-novoplatonivku/; facebook.com/reel/974185048838241/ ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20806
[14] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2061418462128341301;
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20804; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39397; https://t.me/dva_majors/93862; https://t.me/wargonzo/34548; https://t.me/grvZapad/18739; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212796
[16] https://t.me/grvZapad/18739
[17] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212700; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212796; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116199; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/212772
[18] https://t.me/grvZapad/18739
[19] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1320173-narosuvanna-v-persu-cergu-sturmovih-grup-vijskovij-pro-situaciu-v-napramku-slovanska/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39397; https://t.me/rybar/80721; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116179
[21] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2061177509404639665 ; https://t.me/soniah_hub/16104
[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/64182; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43716;
[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/34548; https://t.me/dva_majors/93862; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/116179; https://t.me/rybar/80721
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39397
[25] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1511; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/01/vdvichi-bilshe-artyleriyi-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorozhi-vtraty-vpevneno-zrostayut/
[26] https://t.me/rybar/80749
[27] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2061380915394207953; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15425
[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12060; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2428
[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/43732
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39397;
[31] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2061347611274035483
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14112 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14107; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39397
[33] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/01/trasa-pid-vognevym-kontrolem-spartan-palyt-vorozhu-logistyku-na-pidstupah-do-doneczka/; https://t.me/spartan_ngu/3126
[34] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2061321782687350989; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2061299576251056532; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/21584
[35] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2061220776158646349; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2061086557226844234
[36] https://t.me/milinfolive/173353
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14106; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39397; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14107; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14112
[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/34548
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/; https://x.com/M0nstas/status/2059910254440194328/photo/1
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/
[41] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14107; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14106; https://t.me/wargonzo/34548;
[42] https://t.me/luftwaffe422/934; https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/suhovantazh-iz-boyekomplektom-atakuvaly-drony-422-go-polku-luftwaffe-v-portu-berdyanska/;
[43] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13095
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39368; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14106; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39370; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14107; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39397; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14112
[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/378336; https://t.me/tass_agency/378342; https://t.me/tass_agency/378343; https://t.me/tass_agency/378448; https://news dot ru/vlast/deputat-rasskazal-kak-ukraina-otvetit-za-udar-po-genichesku; https://news dot ru/amp/vlast/v-gosdume-nazvali-otvetstvennyh-za-gibel-rebenka-v-genicheske; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/38791
[46] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/764
[47] https://t.me/kpszsu/63463
[48] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/29507 ; https://t.me/astrapress/114288; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1320103-opiki-ta-minno-vibuhovi-travmi-4-h-poranenih-gospitalizuvali-pisla-ataki-rf-po-budinku-kulturi-snovskij-gromadi/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/65026; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/01/rosijski-drony-atakuvaly-harkiv-ta-peredmistya-ye-postrazhdali/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/29169; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1320373-rf-vdarila-bezpilotnikom-po-lozovij-na-harkivsini-zajnalasa-pozeza-poruc-z-azs/; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2374 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1320015-unaslidok-dvoh-nicnih-atak-na-misto-postrazdali-patero-ludej/; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2361 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/06/01/rosijski-drony-atakuvaly-harkiv-ta-peredmistya-ye-postrazhdali/; https://t.me/idelrealii/45246; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2368 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1319985-v-odesi-rosijskij-bezpilotnik-vluciv-u-bagatopoverhivku-stalasa-pozeza/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/58087 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2381; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1319985-v-odesi-rosijskij-bezpilotnik-vluciv-u-bagatopoverhivku-stalasa-pozeza/? ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/16460 ; https://t.me/astrapress/114296 ; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSODE/posts/pfbid02BdcTd6GH5JowNmKS5hoQy3yJhkmG1F3s68G7H2EDZvmqQuB44NubJCguemuuZoaql?__cft__[0]=AZa1YgwBocF_DMyFJqR59Z6reI2QxJFrF1MTsK3f_ZIitqHydXx8lxGGk5rjFR0yxT9ZkibmLz4FvcW4JZKChSnBYSjZ3QttZIh5EEy0WQJMVEBgH1WN2d_trvfSomHHWc7KpHoGLcuTketNPcFaZoZvERBzocvt6ao2jMKUO32hoQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1319985-v-odesi-rosijskij-bezpilotnik-vluciv-u-bagatopoverhivku-stalasa-pozeza/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=ps; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CiX25YtP3/
[49] https://t.me/energyofukraine/7087; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5052; https://suspilne dot media/1320125-cerez-rosijski-obstrili-e-znestrumlenna-u-vosmi-oblastah-ukraini-minenergo/;
[50] https://www.facebook.com/Ukrzaliznytsia/posts/pfbid0e8kC4s4KK2sZnv53T1uNj7twbsAYSsUK7NoiHNLeixxSbmxtT7JFA77xMykuSoW9l; https://suspilne dot media/1320725-rf-zavdala-541-udar-po-obektah-ukrzaliznici/
[51] https://understandingwar.org/map/russian-strikes-against-train-and-rail-infrastructure-august-2025-to-january-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/
[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/
Assessment as of: 7:15 PM ET, Data Cutoff: 1:00 PM ET
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