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Middle East
Iran & Proxies
Iran Update
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.
US President Donald Trump has requested several amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the United States and Iran remain at odds over key issues. A senior Trump administration official and a second unspecified source told Axios on May 30 that Trump requested several amendments to the draft MoU.[1] The officials said that Trump specifically requested amendments to the draft’s text about how and when the United States would secure Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU).[2] The current draft MoU states that Iran would commit to not pursue a nuclear weapon but does not contain any Iranian commitments to hand over Iran’s HEU or halt enrichment.[3] The current draft states that the United States and Iran would discuss nuclear issues during a 60-day period after the parties sign the MoU.[4] Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran will not suspend uranium enrichment or transfer its HEU from Iran.[5]
A second informed source told Axios that Trump also requested changes to the draft MoU’s text on the Strait of Hormuz.[6] The source did not specify what specific changes Trump requested, however.[7] Trump previously called on Iran on May 29 to “immediately open” the Strait of Hormuz without tolls and to remove mines from the strait.[8] The United States and Iran have different definitions of “opening” the strait, however.[9] Iranian officials and media continue to claim that the strait is “open” despite the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy forcing vessels to transit through Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme.[10] Two unspecified US officials told Axios on May 28 that, under the current draft MoU, Iran would allow “unrestricted” shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, stop imposing tolls and harassing vessels in the strait, and remove naval mines within 30 days, while the United States would lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[11] Iranian officials have also claimed that Iran is charging vessels “protection fees” and “environmental fees” instead of “tolls.”[12] Iran remains the only power that has threatened civilian shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during this war, meaning that its “protection fee” is a protection racket that ships must pay to avoid Iranian attack.
Three US officials separately told the New York Times on May 30 that Trump is concerned about parts of the draft MoU that would involve the United States unfreezing Iranian funds.[13] Trump previously appeared to reject unfreezing Iranian funds on May 29, stating that “no money will be exchanged until further notice.”[14] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that the United States must unfreeze frozen Iranian assets in order for Iran to accept any potential agreement.[15] An Iranian official affiliated with Iran’s negotiating delegation stated on May 30 that Iran could withdraw from a US-Iran agreement if the United States “does not meet its commitments,” including unfreezing Iranian funds.[16]
Unspecified informed sources told Israeli media that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not responded to either the current draft MoU or Trump’s proposed amendments.[17] IRGC-affiliated media argued that it would be better to not reach an agreement than for Iran to accept a “bad deal” that fails to secure Iranian interests.[18]
Anti-regime media, citing an unspecified informed source, claimed on May 31 that President Masoud Pezeshkian has submitted a resignation letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[19] Pezeshkian reportedly warned in an “unprecedented and critical tone” that the IRGC is wielding an outsized role in the regime.[20] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify this report. Iranian state media denied this report and no Iranian officials have confirmed this claim at the time of this writing.[21]
See topline section.
Iran continues to use the Caspian Sea and overland transit routes to try to offset reduced maritime trade caused by the US blockade on Iranian ports, but these alternative routes offer less capacity and efficiency than commercial shipping through the strait. Deputy Parliament Speaker Haji Babaei stated on May 31 that Iran is avoiding the US blockade on Iranian ports by using alternative routes and land corridors.[22] He claimed that Iran now imports at least 50 percent of basic goods through the Caspian Sea and argued that Iran must continue to develop alternative trade routes to ensure Iran’s economic security under the blockade.[23] Iranian state media separately claimed on May 31 that Iran has imported over 20.5 million tons of goods this year, which marks an increase compared to the past two years.[24] Iranian state media added that Indian goods are transported by rail and road to Iran via Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.[25] An economics expert told Radio Free Europe (RFE) on May 6 that alternative routes can supply Iran with goods but cannot fully replace a maritime container-based economy.[26] A former US economic adviser separately told RFE on May 6 that trucking is more expensive than shipping and that Caspian Sea import throughput is constrained by limited port and fleet capacity, which the former adviser stated may raise costs and inflation in Iran.[27]
Nothing significant to report.
Iran fired a ballistic missile at a Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) base in Iraqi Kurdistan on May 31, likely in response to an attack by Kurdish opposition groups in Iran on May 29.[28] The IRGC and IRGC-affiliated media stated on May 31 that the IRGC fired a ballistic missile targeting a PAK base in Iraqi Kurdistan.[29] A PAK spokesperson told Kurdish media on May 31 that an Iranian ballistic missile struck a PAK headquarters in Darashakran, Erbil Province, without causing casualties.[30] The spokesperson added that Iran struck the same base on May 25 with at least four missiles and several drones, which wounded nine people, and claimed that Iranian forces and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have attacked PAK forces over 50 times since the war began on February 28.[31] Iran’s ballistic missile attack on the PAK base comes after likely Kurdish opposition fighters attacked a border guard unit in Chaldran County, West Azerbaijan Province, near Iran’s northwestern border on May 29.[32] It also comes after the IRGC reportedly killed two PAK members in Kermanshah Province on May 28.[33] The Iranian regime has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups of fomenting unrest in Iran and facilitating Israeli operations in Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan.[34]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to conduct ground offensives beyond its “Yellow Line” and has advanced further north of the Litani River in southern Lebanon. The IDF announced on May 30 that 36th Armored Division units have launched new ground offensives on both sides of the Litani River to expand the IDF’s “Yellow Line,” destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, and strengthen the IDF’s operational control in southern Lebanon.[35] Israeli military and political sources, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, announced that the IDF seized Beaufort Castle in Nabatieh District on May 31 as part of the IDF’s new ground offensives.[36] Beaufort Castle is operationally significant to the IDF because the castle is located on high ground, which is favorable for observing ground force movements. The site is also symbolic because the IDF previously seized the site after a significant battle during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.[37] Hezbollah claimed that it used direct fire to defend against Israeli advances into two towns near Beaufort Castle during protracted ground engagements between May 26 and 30.[38] Hezbollah has increasingly used direct fire in protracted ground engagements with advancing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon since May 19.[39]
Hezbollah has expanded the scope of its attacks on northern Israel by targeting larger urban areas deeper inside Israeli territory, likely in response to recent IDF advances in southern Lebanon.[40] Hezbollah claimed for the first time since the ceasefire began on April 16 that it fired rockets targeting Israeli cities more than 10 miles south of the Israel-Lebanon border, including the city of Karmiel and the Krayot suburbs of Haifa, on May 30 and 31.[41] An Israeli military correspondent also reported that Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Acre in northern Israel on May 31, although Hezbollah did not claim this attack.[42]
The United States recently warned Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al Zaydi that the United States opposes the participation of any Iranian-backed Iraqi militia in the next Iraqi government, even if a militia states that it intends to disarm, according to an informed political source speaking to Iraqi media on May 31.[43] The US message reportedly stated that the United States may break off “political or administrative relations” with any ministry affiliated with an Iraqi militia.[44] The US warning comes after a Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on May 25 that some militias have expressed willingness to disarm and engage in Iraqi politics in exchange for securing “senior positions” within the Iraqi government.[45] An Iraqi committee comprised of Zaydi, Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani was reportedly close to finalizing a plan to disarm Iraqi militias, according to a regional media report on May 8.[46] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, including via militia disarmament, since early 2025, but has intensified its efforts in recent months due to militia attacks against US and allied targets in Iraq and the region during the recent war.[47]
[1] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear
[2] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear
[3] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear
[4] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear
[5] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2061085369047626085 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060248796848644099?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-25-2026/; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2026/05/25/irans-new-sponsor-qatar-seeks-to-fund-revolutionary-guards/; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-talks-bog-down-over-nuclear-program-sanctions-relief-31702b6f?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-talks-bog-down-over-nuclear-program-sanctions-relief-31702b6f?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1
[6] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear
[7] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/31/trump-iran-deal-changes-nuclear
[8] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116658423998920803
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-29-2026/
[10] https://t.me/presstv/191896 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060248796848644099?s=20 ; https://t.me/farsna/438636; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2026/05/27/769383/lessons-war-strait-hormuz-nuclear-sovereignty-define-iran-redlines-today; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-29-2026/
[11] https://www.axios.com/2026/05/28/iran-peace-deal-trump-approval
[12] https://t.me/mehrnews/381432
[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/30/us/politics/trump-iran-peace-framework.html
[14] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116658423998920803
[15] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/418098 ; https://www.iranintl.com/202605246647 ; https://x.com/IranIntlbrk/status/2055925293504672002?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060688665181851778?s=20
[16] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2060820198689473011 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/419115
[17] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-897909
[18] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/419115
[19] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202605312204
[20] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202605312204
[21] https://t.me/iribnews/342337 ; https://t.me/defapress_ir/60015 ; https://t.me/farsna/439072
[22] https://t.me/defapress_ir/60002
[23] https://t.me/defapress_ir/60002
[24] https://t.me/iribnews/342310
[25] https://t.me/iribnews/342310
[26] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-pakistan-turkey-russia-caspian-china/33751260.html
[27] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-pakistan-turkey-russia-caspian-china/33751260.html
[28] https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/198919 ; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/419138 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/ ; https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/kurdistan/958742
[29] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/419138 ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/198919
[30] https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/kurdistan/958742
[31] https://rudaw dot net/english/categories/kurdistan/958742
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/ ; https://t.me/defapress_ir/59905
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/ ; https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/198859
[34] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-protests-mahsa-amini-crackdown-kurdistan-government-forces-shoot-rcna58496 ; https://nournews dot ir/Fa/News/127294/
[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2060927439346307299?s=20
[36] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2060927439346307299?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2060939449345720769?s=20 ; https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2061039608746361120?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2060028255109832818?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-28-2026/ ; https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2061013048983253015?s=20 ;
https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2060939449345720769?s=20 ; https://x.com/Stinky915846091/status/2061072355711951049?s=20
[37] https://t.me/moriahdoron/31184 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2060939449345720769?s=20 ; https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/2061039608746361120?s=20
[38] https://t.me/mmirleb/16873 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16691
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-28-2026/ ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16691 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-4-2026/ ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16390 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-20-2026/
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/
[41] https://t.me/mmirleb/16885 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/16875
[42] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2061025482636750893?s=20
[43] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/انقسام-داخل-ال-طار-التنسيقي-بش-ن-حل-الحشد-وفصا-ل-تهدد-بالمغادرة
[44] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/انقسام-داخل-ال-طار-التنسيقي-بش-ن-حل-الحشد-وفصا-ل-تهدد-بالمغادرة
[45] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/انقسام-داخل-ال-طار-التنسيقي-بش-ن-حل-الحشد-وفصا-ل-تهدد-بالمغادرة
[46] https://english.aawsat dot com/arab-world/5271010-three-member-committee-negotiates-washington-disarming-iraqi-factions
[47] https://almadapaper dot net/410670/ ; https://www.newarab dot com/analysis/iraqs-elections-high-stakes-vote-amid-us-iran-tug-war ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/10/secretary-rubios-call-with-iraqi-prime-minister-mohammed-shiaa-al-sudani-2
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